Human Rights Begin at Home: A Policy Analysis of Litigating International Human Rights in U.S. State Courts by Gabrielidis, Anna Maria
Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 
Volume 12 Article 5 
9-1-2006 
Human Rights Begin at Home: A Policy Analysis of Litigating 
International Human Rights in U.S. State Courts 
Anna Maria Gabrielidis 
Public Defender's Office, Las Crucer, NM 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/bhrlr 
 Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Litigation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Anna M. Gabrielidis, Human Rights Begin at Home: A Policy Analysis of Litigating International Human 
Rights in U.S. State Courts, 12 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 139 (2006). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/bhrlr/vol12/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Human Rights Law Review by an authorized 
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
HUMAN RIGHTS BEGIN AT HOME: A POLICY
ANALYSIS OF LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN U.S. STATE COURTS
Anna Maria Gabrielidis*
Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In
small places, close to home .... Unless these rights have
meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere. Without
concerted citizen action to uphold them close to home, we
shall look in vain for progress in the larger world.
Eleanor Roosevelt, 1953
I. INTRODUCTION
Although there is some truth to the notion that the United States
(U.S.) Constitution provides more guarantees than does international law,
there are areas where it is not as protective. Consequently, instances of
U.S. violations of international human rights law (JHRL) continue to arise.'
For example, the Constitution only protects negative rights and does not
guarantee basic human needs.2 Despite the fact that the U.S. Supreme
Assistant Public Defender, Las Cruces, New Mexico; LL.M., Center for Civil
and Human Rights, Notre Dame Law School, 2005; J.D., Notre Dame Law School,
2004; B.A., New Mexico State University, 2000. An earlier version of this paper
was submitted to Notre Dame Law School in partial fulfillment of the Master of
Laws degree in International Human Rights Law. Thanks to Professor Patricia
Bellia for her helpful suggestions on my thesis, to Garth Meinjtes for his continual
support and to Rory Rank for training me in the arts of war and peace. Thanks also
to my mom, Victoria, and siblings Cristina, Michael and Kathy, for reminding me
that respect for human rights really does begin at home.
1 See infra text Parts III and IV It is inaccurate to believe that Americans do not
need the protection of IHRL. The U.S. has violated IHRL in areas as diverse as
"'racial and gender discrimination, prison conditions, immigrants' rights, language
discrimination, the death penalty, police brutality, freedom of expression and relig-
ious freedom ...." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT ON U.S. COMPLI-
ANCE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 2-3
(1993).
2 Mark S. Kende, The South African Constitutional Court's Embrace of Socio-
Economic Rights: A Comparative Perspective, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 137, 137 (2003).
Human rights are generally divided into three generations of rights. The first gen-
eration of rights are political and civil rights, and are commonly referred to as
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Court (Supreme Court) has firmly held that the Constitution does not pro-
vide a right to education,3 adequate housing,4 or welfare benefits, 5 these are
basic tenants of IHRL.6 Moreover, any federal legislation or funding con-
cerning social welfare (such as education or social security) is discretionary.
Thus, the Government, without violating anyone's Constitutional rights,
may choose to cut funds or even abandon the program entirely. 7 Yet, be-
cause state constitutions often have stronger positive and substantive rights
to interpret, it is in state courts that human rights litigation can be most
effective.
By comparing U.S. federal court litigation with state court litigation
aimed at enforcing IHRL, this paper examines the role that state courts can
and should play in the implementation of human rights in the U.S. The
paper briefly comments on international institutions in Part II as a means to
reinforce the reasons why, in the current atmosphere, domestic courts are
the only alternative for implementing IHRL in the U.S. Part III provides
the background for IHRL and its applicability and enforcement in the U.S.
legal system. State court use of IHRL is examined in Part IV. Finally, Part
V focuses on why state courts, as opposed to federal courts, may be the
proper forum for the enforcement of human rights. They say that human
"negative rights." The second generation of rights encompasses social and eco-
nomic obligations, and are called "positive rights." Environmental, or -'green"
rights, form the third generation of rights. Louis HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS
475 (1999).
3 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (holding that "[p]ublic education is not
a 'right' granted to individuals by the Constitution."). See also San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (finding that "[e]ducation, of course,
is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.
Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.").
4 Lindsay v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (finding that "the Constitution does
not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to
perceive in [it] any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular
quality .... ").
5 "Welfare benefits are not a fundamental right, and neither the State nor Federal
Government is under any sort of constitutional obligation to guarantee minimum
levels of support." Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 584 n.9 (1976) (citation
omitted).
6 See infra text Part III and accompanying notes.
7 See Helen Hershkoff, Forward: Positive Rights and the Evolution of State
Constitutions, 33 RUTGERS L. J. 799, 823 (2002) ("Today, as poor individuals face
a total cut-off in federal funds because of the federal statutory five-year cap on
welfare payments under the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Act, federal
abandonment appears less unlikely.").
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rights begin at home; this paper examines why human rights litigation
should begin in state courts.
II. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
The United Nations (U.N.) has successfully codified a wide range
of human rights, yet its lack of an effective enforcement mechanism contin-
ues to be its major weakness. 8 In addition, litigating an American's human
rights before an international or regional institution is both impractical and,
in many instances, impossible. The relevant bodies - the International
Criminal Court (ICC), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), and the U.N. Human Rights Committee
(HRC) - either lack an enforcement mechanism or may lack jurisdiction to
hear cases where the U.S. is a party. As a result, domestic litigation is the
only alternative.
A. International Criminal Court
There are some crimes of such magnitude that the international
community should be involved. Moreover, the local judiciary is unlikely to
be capable of dealing with certain complex crimes such as gross violations
of human rights. This does not imply that trials should not be held in the
country where the crimes occurred, rather that tribunals should be estab-
lished under international assistance, or that an international court may take
the case if justice cannot be achieved at the local level. This approach cre-
ates international precedence and also adheres to the laws regarding crimi-
nal accountability for violations of international human rights.
The ICC was created by the Rome Statute and adopted by the U.N.
in 1998, coming into effect on July 1, 2002.9 The crimes within its jurisdic-
tion are limited to genocide, certain crimes against humanity, and certain
war crimes. 10 In 2002, the U.S. "unsigned" its ratification, 1 apparently out
8 For much of the past 60 years, our focus has been on articulating,
codifying and enshrining rights. That effort produced a remarka-
ble framework of laws, standards and mechanisms - the Univer-
sal Declaration, the international covenants, and much else. Such
work needs to continue in some areas. But the era of declaration
is now giving way, as it should, to an era of implementation.
Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General, Address to the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights (Apr. 7, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=
1388.
9 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998).
10 Id. at art. 5.
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of uncertainty over whether the Court's jurisdiction "might be expanded
later . . . to include acts of aggression and that U.S. nationals might be
subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC.''12 Regardless, the limited subject
matter jurisdiction of the ICC is not especially helpful to the broader legal
strategy of applying IHRL to Americans.
B. International Court of Justice
The IC, also referred to as the World Court, is the principal judi-
cial organ of the U.N.13 A civil court situated in The Hague, the ICJ has
jurisdiction only over disputes between states, meaning that the ICJ is an
inappropriate venue for individual Americans to challenge U.S. law and
policy. 14 Moreover, the ICJ has been perceived as "incapable ... of resolv-
ing disputes" 15 because "throughout its 60-year history, the court has aver-
aged only a few cases a year, and has rendered a decision in fewer than 100
all told." 16 This is in large part due to the ability of countries to restrict the
court's jurisdiction over them. After 40 years of accepting the general juris-
diction 17 of the ICJ, an unfavorable ruling 18 by the court in 1986 over the
11 In a letter to U.N. Secretary-General, the U.S. government wrote that the U.S.,
in effect, "unsigned" the Rome Statute:
This is to inform you, in connection with the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court adopted on July 17, 1998, that the
United States does not intend to become a party to the treaty.
Accordingly, the United States has no legal obligations arising
from its signature on December 31, 2000.
Letter from John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and Interna-
tional Security, to Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General (May 6, 2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm.
12 JORDAN J. PAUST, JOAN M. FITZPATRICK & JON M. VAN DYKE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S 42 (2000). However, U.S. nationals can be sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the ICC even without U.S. ratification. See Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998) re-
printed in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
13 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 1 (1945), available at http://
www.icj-cij .org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm.
14 Id. at art. 34.
15 Eric A. Posner, Op-Ed, All Justice, Too, is Local, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2004, at
A23.
16 Id.
17 General or compulsory jurisdiction occurs when a state files a declaration in
which they consent to be sued by any other state that has filed a similar declaration.
18 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
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U.S.' mining of Nicaraguan harbors prompted the U.S. to withdraw from
the court's general (compulsory) jurisdiction. 19
Although the U.S. still accepts the ICJ's jurisdiction under specific
treaties, it is becoming increasingly hostile to negative judgments. On
March 7, 2005, in response to a 2004 ICJ decision in the Avena case order-
ing new hearings for 51 Mexicans on death row in the U.S., the U.S. with-
drew from the protocol of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(VCCR)20 that gave the ICJ the jurisdiction to hear such a dispute between
Mexico and the U.S. 21 This came after a surprising February 28, 2005
memorandum from President Bush to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales
directing state courts to "give effect to the [ICJ] decision in accordance with
general principles of comity. '22 The U.S.' objections in the Avena case
revolved around the concern that it would be an abuse of the ICJ's jurisdic-
tion for it to make "far-reaching and unsustainable findings concerning the
United States criminal justice systems. ' 23 The ICJ refused to uphold the
U.S.' objection.
The U.S. Supreme Court has avoided the question of how to en-
force the Avena judgment against the U.S. In Medellin v. Dretke,24 the Su-
preme Court faced the issue of what remedy, if any, should be provided to
the 51 Mexican nationals who were not given their treaty right to seek help
from their consulate as soon as they were arrested. Instead of deciding the
merits of the case, the Supreme Court dismissed the case as "improvidently
granted" 25 due in large part to President Bush's memorandum. Although
the decision left open the opportunity for the Supreme Court to embrace
international law and institutions, the effect may be limited because of the
U.S.' withdrawal from such cases.
19 Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn From World Judicial Body, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at A16.
20 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. LEXIS 11
(Mar. 31). Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR].
21 Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases, WASH. PosT, Mar. 10,
2005, at Al.
22 Memorandum from George W. Bush to the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005),
cited in Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088, 2090 (2005).
23 Quoted in Avena, 2004 I.C.J. LEXIS at *39, para. 27.
24 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005).
25 Id. at 2089.
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C. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights
In the Inter-American process cases begin at the IACHR after the
victim has exhausted all local remedies. After analyzing the case (which
may include hearings with both parties), the IACHR prepares a report with
recommendations for the state, which then has a certain amount of time to
comply. If the state does not comply, the IACHR may choose to submit the
case to the IACtHR. In fact, that is the only way a case gets to the
IACtHR. 26
Thus, the IACHR, located in Washington, D.C., is a quasi-judicial
body of the Organization of American States (OAS). The IACHR has the
jurisdiction to hear only complaints against the U.S. that allege violations of
the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (American Dec-
laration). 27 The U.S. government has "accepted the competence and author-
ity of the Commission" 28 to hear cases that allege violations of this
Declaration. The IACtHR, on the other hand, is a purely judicial organ of
the OAS and is located in Costa Rica. The IACtHR has no formal mecha-
nism for enforcement of judgments; if a state fails to comply with a deci-
sion, the IACtHR may only inform and make recommendations to the OAS
General Assembly. Because the U.S. is not bound by the American Con-
vention on Human Rights (American Convention),29 the only complaints
26 A State may, however, petition the Court directly for an advisory opinion on the
interpretation of the Convention (art. 60), other treaties (art. 61) or a state's domes-
tic laws (art. 62). Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, arts. 60-62, OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4, rev. 9 (2003).
27 Organization of American States, American Declaration on the Rights and Du-
ties of Man, May 2, 1948, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human
Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L./V/ll.71, Doc. 6, rev. 1, at 17
(1988) [hereinafter American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man]. See
David Harris, Regional Protection of Human Rights: The Inter-American Achieve-
ment, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (David J. Harris &
Stephen Livingstone eds., 1998).
28 Center for Economic and Social Rights, Petition to the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights, at IV(A) (June 9, 2003), available at http://www.cesr.
org/low/node/view/361. See Charter of the Organization of American States, art.
106 (1997); Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 20(a)
(Oct. 1979); Coard v. U.S., Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1283, OEA/ser. LIV/
11.106, doc. 3 rev., 36 (1999).
29 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
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that the IACtHR can hear are those brought under the American Declara-
tion, which is of a more general nature than the American Convention.
Americans face tough or even insurmountable obstacles in the In-
ter-American system. Difficulties include the exhaustion of remedies re-
quirement, the lack of jurisdiction over U.S. violations of the American
Convention, and the fact that the IACtHR's judgments are incapable of be-
ing enforced. The only option is to petition the IACHR, but their subject
matter is limited to the American Declaration and their recommendations
are persuasive rather than binding. For example, in response to a report by
the IACHR in 2001 that found that the U.S. violated the rights of American
Indians, the U.S. said that the "government rejects the Commission's report
in its entirety and does not intend to comply with the Commission's recom-
mendations." 30 The U.S. is unashamed of its irreverence towards interna-
tional bodies, an attitude that is unlikely to be modified anytime in the near
future.
D. The Human Rights Committee
The HRC is the U.N. body that examines the periodic reports that
states are required to submit pursuant to the provisions of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).31 The fact that the U.S.
attached a non-self-executing clause to this treaty 32 helps explain why the
HRC's report on the U.S. noted its concern with many aspects of American
life, including societal discriminatory attitudes based on race and/or gender,
the excessive number of offenses punishable by the death penalty and the
long stay on death row, the large number of people killed or mistreated by
the police, prison conditions, the election of judges, the high cost of running
for political office, the rights and plights of Native Americans, and the
number of minorities living below the poverty line.33
These international and regional judicial institutions offer little re-
course to Americans who claim a violation of their human rights. Their
lack of jurisdiction over the U.S., the lack of an individual complaint mech-
anism, and the U.S.' resistance to their judgments are hefty obstacles for
Americans who wish to litigate IHRL outside the U.S. Domestic courts are,
30 Quoted in THE FORD FOUNDATION, CLOSE TO HOME: CASE STUDIES OF HUMAN
RIGHTS WORK IN THE UNITED STATES 37 (2004) [hereinafter FORD FOUNDATION].
31 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. GAOR 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter
ICCPR].
32 See infra text Parts III, IV.
33 Human Rights Comm., 53rd Sess., Comments on United States of America,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add 50 (1995).
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in the end, more helpful to individual Americans because the international
community has failed to provide effective international enforcement mecha-
nisms. It is therefore up to the lawyers and judges of each locality to give
effect to international human rights.
III. BACKGROUND: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS AND
THEIR APPLICABILITY IN THE U.S.
A. Major Human Rights Instruments
There are dozens of human rights treaties and instruments, a few of
which are highly respected documents. The following instruments are those
which have garnered enough international legitimacy that citing them in
U.S. courts would not be unprecedented.
1. International Bill of Rights
This is perhaps the most famous body of IHRL. It includes the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),34 the ICCPR35 and its op-
tional protocols, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).36
a. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
As a declaration adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948,
the UDHR37 is the primary U.N. document codifying human rights stan-
dards and norms. The UDHR is not a legal document and therefore cannot
be invoked as a source of legal obligation, although there are compelling
arguments for "viewing all or part of the Declaration as legally binding,
either as a matter of customary international law or as an authoritative inter-
pretation of the UN Charter."38 These approaches will be examined in Parts
III and IV.
34 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
35 ICCPR, supra note 31.
36 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
[hereinafter ICESCR].
37 UDHR, supra note 34, at 71.
38 HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CON-
TEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 143 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter STEINER & AL-
STON]. See also Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287 (1996)
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b. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The ICCPR3 9 declares the basic civil and political rights of individ-
uals, such as: the right to life;40 the right to liberty and freedom of move-
ment;41 the right to equality before the law;42 the right to privacy; 43 freedom
of thought, conscience, and religion;44 freedom of opinion and expression; 45
and freedom of assembly and association. 46 Moreover, this treaty prohibits
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, 47 slavery and detention,48 and
the use of the death penalty on juveniles. 49 Although the U.S. has signed
and ratified the ICCPR, the Senate attached a non-self-executing clause as
well as many reservations, meaning the treaty has almost no legal conse-
quence in the U.S. 50 The U.S. has not signed either of the Optional
Protocols.51
c. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
Signed in 1977, the U.S. has yet to ratify the ICESCR,52 which has
142 parties. The ICESCR establishes the basic economic, social, and cul-
tural rights of all people. It describes such rights as: the right to self-deter-
mination; the right to wages sufficient to support a minimum standard of
living; the right to equal pay for equal work; the right to form trade unions;
and the right to free primary education.
(concluding that the UDHR is widely accepted in the U.S. as one of the sources of
evidence of customary international law (CIL)).
39 ICCPR, supra note 31.
40 Id. at art. 6.
41 Id. at arts. 9, 12.
42 Id. at art. 14.
43 Id. at art. 17.
44 Id. at art. 18.
45 ICCPR, supra note 31, at art. 19.
46 Id. at arts. 21, 22.
47 Id. at art. 7.
48 Id. at art. 8.
49 Id. at art. 6.
50 The U.S. reservations are in regards to free speech (art. 20), capital punishment
(art. 6), and treating juveniles as adults (art. 10).
51 G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 59, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); G.A. Res 44/128, annex, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, at 207, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Dec. 14, 1989).
52 G.A. Res 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
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2. U.N. Charter
The U.S. became a member of the U.N. at its inception in 1945.
The Charter of the U.N. (U.N. Charter) 53 provides brief references to human
rights, linking human rights with human dignity without further guidance
on what this requires.
3. American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man
Although it is not a treaty, the American Declaration, 54 adopted by
the OAS and signed by the U.S in 1948, is considered to embody binding
principles of customary international law (CIL).55 All OAS member states
are obliged to uphold its principles. 56 The American Declaration addresses
the full range of human rights - from civil and political to economic, social,
and cultural.
4. American Convention on Human Rights
The American Convention57 is applicable on a regional level to
member states of the OAS. However, the U.S. has not ratified its 1977
signing.
5. U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women
The U.S. signed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 58 in 1988 but, despite several at-
tempts, has not ratified it.59 CEDAW prohibits discrimination against wo-
men (providing, for the first time in an international instrument, a definition
53 June 26, 1945, 892 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter U.N. Charter].
54 American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 27, at 17.
55 Richard J. Wilson, Defending a Criminal Case with International Human
Rights Law, CHAMPION 28, 30 (2000).
56 Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention of Human Rights,
Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, 1989 Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) No. 10 (July 14,
1989).
57 Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
11 Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
59 Objections in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to ratification of
CEDAW included the belief that "creating another set of unenforceable intema-
tional standards will further dilute respect for international human rights." STEINER
& ALSTON, supra note 38, at 207, citing S384-10, Exec. Rep. Sen. Comm. on For.
Rel., Oct. 3, 1994. See also Marian Nash, U.S. Practice: Contemporary Practice of
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for this form of discrimination) and requires governments to work to ad-
vance the equality of women in the fields of politics, law, employment,
education, health care, commercial transactions and domestic relations.
6. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child
Although the U.S. signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC) 60 in 1995, it remains one of two countries (the other being Somalia)
that has not ratified the CRC, the most widely adopted human rights treaty
in history. 61 The CRC recognizes and establishes that children are individu-
als with civil, cultural, economic, social, and political rights.
7. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination
When the U.S. ratified the International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 62 in 1994, it made
many reservations regarding free speech and individual private conduct.
Moreover, the U.S. Senate declared the Convention non-self-executing.
CERD's definition of "racial discrimination" covers not only intentional
discrimination, but also neutral laws or practices that have a discriminatory
impact. 63
8. U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)64 was signed by the U.S. in 1988
and ratified in 1994. At that time, the Senate included a non-self-executing
declaration along with numerous reservations. The U.S. established crimi-
nal and civil liability in the federal courts for those responsible for torture in
other countries .65
the United States Relating to International Law, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 96, 102-09
(1995).
60 Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
61 STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 38, at 511.
62 Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
63 See id. art. 1.
64 Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
65 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-40B (1994) (creating the crime of acts of torture com-
mitted abroad); Torture Victims Protection Act, 28 USC § 1350 (1994), infra Part
III(C)(2).
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9. U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Genocide Convention) 66 prohibits genocidal acts "committed
with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or
religious group. '67 The U.S. signed the Genocide Convention in 1948 and
ratified it forty years later, in 1988. As required by the Convention, the
U.S. outlawed genocide as a federal offense.
68
The following two tables outline the legal authority of these inter-
national human rights instruments and provide examples of areas where
IHRL offers broader protections than currently available under U.S. law.
Unfortunately, the U.S. government passed up its first opportu-
nity to prosecute a torturer under this new power. Ricardo Tomas
Anderson, a major in Peru's Army Intelligence Service whom the
U.S. State Department had identified as a torturer, was arrested
upon U.S. Justice Department instructions in early March 2000,
after he had flown to the United States to testify before the
[IACHR]. However, under a strained and unsustainable interpre-
tation of diplomatic immunity, Acting Secretary of State Thomas
Pickering ordered his release.
Kenneth Roth, The Charade of U.S. Ratification of International Human Rights
Treaties, 1 CHi. J. INT'L L. 347, 350 n.9 (2000) (citations omitted).
66 Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
67 Id. at art. 2.
68 See Genocide Convention Implementation Act, 18 USC §§ 1091-93 (1994).
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TABLE 1
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS AND THEIR
CURRENT APPLICABILITY IN U.S. COURTS
6 9
Instrument U.S. Action Whether Instrument is Effect in U.S. Courts
Self-Executing or Non-
Self-Executing (NSE)
UDHR Member of the U.N. Not a legal document Non-binding; interpretive
use only (arts. 3, 5, 7, 9,
12 and 13 are CIL) 70
ICCPR Signed and ratified No (there is a NSE Non-binding; defensive
clause) and interpretive use only
ICESCR Signed - Non-binding; interpretive
use only
U.N. Charter Member of the U.N. Arguably no (there is a Non-binding; interpretive
NSE clause)7 1  use only
American Signed Not a legal document Binding as a source of
Declaration CIL
American Signed - Non-binding; interpretive
Convention use only
CEDAW Signed Non-binding; interpretive
use only
CRC Signed Non-binding; interpretive
use only
CERD Signed and ratified No (there is a NSE Non-binding; defensive
clause) and interpretive use only
CAT Signed and ratified No (there is a NSE Non-binding; defensive
clause) and interpretive use only
Genocide Signed and ratified Yes Binding
Convention
69 Portions of the UDHR, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR "may be used as part of
customary law of nations or as authoritative interpretations of the United Nations
Charter." Kathryn Burke et al., Application of International Human Rights Law in
State and Federal Courts, 18 TEX. INT'L L. J. 291, 309 (1983). See, e.g., Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980) (referring to the UDHR and ICCPR
as evidence of CIL or universal prohibitions); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F.Supp.
2d 1322, 1345 n.24 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (citing the ICCPR for authority that torture
violates obligatory norms of CIL); Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157
F.Supp. 2d 1345, 1359-60 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (finding that art. 6 of the ICCPR is
CIL); Sarei v. Rio Tinto Plc, 221 F.Supp. 2d 1116, 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing
the ICESCR, stating that it is "well-settled that racial discrimination is a violation
of the law of nations.").
70 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24) (pleadings) (where the U.S. Executive Branch recognized
these as human rights guaranteed under CIL). It can also be argued that the UDHR
constitutes an authoritative interpretation of the U.N. Charter.
71 See Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 722-25 (1952) (stating, in dictum, that
arts. 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter are non-self-executing).
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TABLE 2
AREAS WHERE IHRL PROVIDES BROADER PROTECTIONS THAN U.S. LAW
Discrimination and 1. The UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR require protection of rights
Affirmative Action "without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status." 72 This is more extensive than many state and
federal rights.
2. ICCPR Art. 26 prohibits discrimination against undocumented
workers.
3. CERD Arts. 1(4) and 2(2) provide that certain affirmative action
measures are not to be deemed racial discrimination and, in fact, may
be required.
Criminal Justice 1. ICCPR Art. 15(1) and American Convention Art. 9 require that a
criminal offender benefit from a legislated reduction in penalty that
occurs after his or her crime. The same is not required by federal
law.
7 3
2. ICCPR Art. 7 and UDHR Art. 5 prohibit "cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment." This proscribes more conduct
than the U.S. Constitution's Eighth Amendment prohibition against
"cruel and unusual punishment[ ]." The "treatment or punishment"
referred to in the above noted ICCPR and UDHR articles applies to
non-punishment cases, whereas the Supreme Court has held that the
Eighth Amendment does not apply to non-criminal penalties.
7 4
3. Forcible abduction abroad for prosecution is an "arbitrary arrest"
under ICCPR Art. 9, but is permitted in the U.S.
7 5
4. The Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR prohibits the death
penalty.
Education The UDHR Art. 26, ICCPR Art. 3 and CRC Art. 28 provide for the
right to a free education.
Health Care ICESCR Art. 12 recognizes the right of everyone to the "highest
standard of physical and mental health," requiring the state to provide,
among other things, children's healthcare and a clean environment.
Welfare ICESCR Art. 9 recognizes the right to social security.
Environment The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992)76
recognizes the duty of states to ensure that no damage is done to the
environment, and that states must conserve, protect and restore the
health of the ecosystem.
Food and Housing UDHR Art. 25 and ICESCR Art. 11 recognize the right to an
adequate standard of living, including food, clothing and housing.
Children The CRC requires the state to protect the child and to ensure the
survival and development of the child, including through health care
and housing.
7 7
72 ICCPR, supra note 31, at art. 2(1); ICESCR, supra note 36, at art. 2(2); UDHR,
supra note 34, at art. 2.
71 See United States v. Kirby, 176 F.2d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1949).
74 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1971).
71 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). See also Celiberti de
Casariego v. Uru., Communication No. R. 13/56, 10.1-12, U.N. GAOR, 36th
Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 185, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (Jul. 29, 1981).
76 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/
Rev.1, 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992).
77 But cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189
(1989) (where the Supreme Court held that one cannot sue the Department of
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B. International Law and International Human Rights Law as U.S. Law
International law and international agreements are the law of the
U.S. and thus the supreme law of the states.7 8 The Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution declares that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the land. ' '79 Moreover, Article III, Section 2 of
the Constitution provides that cases arising under international law or
agreements are within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.80 Thus, a claim
involving international law arises under the laws of the United States.
However, although U.S. courts are obligated to give effect to these interna-
tional instruments, a non- self-executing declaration by the Senate renders
the instrument non-binding. 81
Self-executing treaties are those agreements that can be easily given
effect by "executive or judicial bodies, federal or State, without further leg-
islation,"8 2 unless the treaty intends the contrary. This distinction was for-
mulated by Chief Justice Marshall in the 1828 case of Foster v. Neilson.8 3
In Foster, the Court found that:
Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land.
It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as
Social Services for failing to protect a boy who was repeatedly and severely beaten
by his father because the Due Process Clause does not require the state to "protect
life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.").
78 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (holding that a treaty between the
U.S. and U.K. is binding on the states); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW § 111 (1987).
79 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
80 Id. at art. 3, § 2 ("The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity,
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their authority.").
81 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 (1987) states that an
international agreement of the United States is "non-self-execut-
ing" (a) if the agreement manifests an intention that it shall not
become effective as domestic law without the enactment of im-
plementing legislation, (b) if the Senate, in giving consent to a
treaty, or Congress by resolution, requires implementing legisla-
tion, or (c) if implementing legislation is constitutionally
required.
82 Id. cmt. 5.
83 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
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equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates
of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But
when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when
either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the
treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial de-
partment; and the legislature must execute the contract
before it can become a rule for the court. 84
Self-executing clauses enable individuals to challenge, in state or
federal courts, violations of a treaty's rights. 85 Because the Senate has in-
cluded a non-self-executing clause to almost every significant international
human rights instrument, this judicially created notion of non-self-executing
treaties is the biggest obstacle facing the implementation of IHRL in U.S.
courts.8 6 The Senate intended these clauses to prevent the instrument from
creating a private cause of action in U.S. courts.8 7
Moreover, Congress is limited by international norms. The Charm-
ing Betsy principle requires that Congressional acts "ought never to be con-
strued to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains. '88 Yet in relation to international human rights treaties, the Su-
preme Court has held that treaties are subject to the Bill of Rights.89 For
example, in United States v. Steinberg,90 a federal district court held that the
U.N. Charter was part of the supreme law of the U.S. but that it could not
run counter to Constitution. Scholars have argued that according to the
84 Id. at 314.
85 See OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 8809,
DIGEST OF THE UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (1974).
86 The ICCPR, CERD, and CAT have non-self-executing clauses, whereas the
Genocide Convention does not.
87 S. ExEc. Doc. No. 102-23, at 19 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 648.
88 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address at the Proceedings of the Ninety-Sixth
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 16, 2002), in
96 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC., 348, 350 (2002):
The court on which I sit has held, for more than two hundred
years, that acts of Congress should be construed to be consistent
with international law, absent clear expression to the contrary.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, this doctrine is rarely utilized
in our court's contemporary jurisprudence. I can think of only
two cases during my more than twenty years on the Supreme
Court that have relied upon this interpretive principle.
89 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988).
90 478 F. Supp. 29, 33 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
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rules of treaty interpretation found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 91 human rights treaties to which the U.S. is a party must be given
full effect in U.S. courts, despite the U.S.' reservations or non-self-execut-
ing clauses. 92 However, this argument has not swayed the courts.93
In addition to treaties, CIL is also considered part of U.S. law. In
The Paquete Habana case, 94 the Supreme Court recognized that
"[i]nternational law is part of our law"95 and that "where there is no treaty,
and no controlling executive or legislative act or juricial decision, resort
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations. '' 96 Two issues
confront a court deciding whether to apply CIL to protect individual rights:
(1) "whether customary international law may be invoked by an individual
in a United States court"97 and (2) "how to establish that a particular right is
protected by customary international law. '98 Once CIL is determined, how-
ever, it can be used, at the minimum, for its interpretive value, to be dis-
cussed below.
91 May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679. Art. 19(c) provides that a nation-state "may, when
signing, ratifying, accepting, approving, or acceding to [an international] treaty,
formulate a reservation unless ... the reservation is incompatible with the object
and purpose of the treaty." Id. at art. 19(c). Despite its non-ratification, the U.S.
acknowledges that the VCCR has risen to the level of CIL and is the authoritative
guide to treaty interpretation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE U.S. pt. III, introductory note (citing a Department of State letter to the
President that "although not yet in force, the Convention is already generally recog-
nized as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice.").
92 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and
Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 399, 447-49 (2000).
93 See, e.g., Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 140-43 (3rd Cir. 2005) (rejecting the
argument and holding instead that where the President and the Senate express a
shared consensus on the meaning of a treaty as part of the ratification process, that
meaning is to govern in the domestic context.).
94 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
95 Id. at 700.
96 Id.
97 Burke et al., supra note 69, at 315.
98 Id.
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1. Treaties as Binding Law
Attempting to litigate human rights in federal courts using treaties
has had mixed results. 99 The few cases that have argued for the domestic
enforcement of international human rights have been rejected by most
courts. 100 For example, in Buell v. Mitchell,'0' the Sixth Circuit refused to
hold that the imposition of the death penalty violated international agree-
ments, stating that even if it did, the agreements would not be binding in
federal courts. Moreover, in White v. Paulsen,10 2 a Federal District Court in
Washington held that no private right of action exists or should be implied
under the ICCPR or the CAT due to their non-self-executing clauses. Al-
though persuasive arguments can be made on both sides of the issue, federal
courts have expressed an unwillingness to apply, as binding law, interna-
tional human rights treaties if Congress has attached a non-self-executing
clause.
2. Treaties as Interpretive Aids
A treaty with a non-self-executing clause may, however, be utilized
for its interpretive value or to provide a rule for decision. Using treaties or
international law as a tool for interpreting federal law has the benefit of
maintaining judicial independence by not forcing the court to believe they
are bound by international law. This process requires that lawyers urge the
courts to "accept the basic normative principles of such instruments, and
apply these principles in the interpretation of our own laws." 10 3 Persuading
a court to recognize even the basic, underlying principle of IHRL, i.e. the
respect for human dignity, may be all that is needed for a judge to re-ex-
amine a law in favor of a human rights-friendly interpretation. But urging a
court to believe that IHRL is binding law may backfire, according to Hans
A. Linde, former Justice of the Supreme Court of Oregon:
99 See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Use of International Law in the American Ad-
judicative Process, 27 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 431 (2004).
lOO See, e.g., Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 370-76 (6th Cir. 2001) (refusing to
hold that the imposition of the death penalty violated international agreements, and
stating that even if it did, the agreements would not be binding on federal courts);
White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1386-87 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (holding that no
private right of action exists or should be implied under the ICCPR or the CAT).
101 274 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 2001).
102 997 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. Wash. 1998).
103 Ann I. Park, Human Rights and Basic Needs: Using International Human
Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. Rnv. 1195,
1249 (1987).
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To point to the international standard as a goal or an
achievement to be matched may prove very successful. To
point to it as an external law to be obeyed may backfire. It
may backfire because, unless the legally binding nature of
the international source is clear and strong, opposing coun-
sel and the court may give more time and attention to refut-
ing the claim that the international source has binding force
than to looking at the substance of the human rights in
question. 104
Proof of the validity of Justice Linde's warning can be found in the Fifth
Circuit. In 2004, after the ICJ ruled that the U.S. violated 51 Mexican na-
tionals' rights, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case again.
In a thorough analysis, it ruled that despite the ICJ's decision, the Mexican
citizen before its court was procedurally barred from raising the treaty
claim.105
The alternative of using IHRL as an interpretive tool has met with
success in some federal courts. It entails the use of IHRL to "give new
content and substance to constitutional guarantees,"' 1 6 for example, by help-
ing interpret the "'open-ended' equal protection and due process guarantees
of the fourteenth and fifth amendments in order to heighten judicial scrutiny
of legislation which affects those guarantees."107 Because international law
often "demands a higher standard of protection for basic needs than the
American law currently provides under the fourteenth amendment," 108 there
is a definite benefit to urging a federal judge to use IHRL to interpret the
Constitution. For example, in the 1989 case of Ahmad v. Wigen, 10 9 a federal
district court in New York declared that international customs and treaties
are not "derogatory" to our Constitution.' 10 On the contrary, the court ex-
plained, "they expand and give substance to a developing enriched concept
of rights of the individual that harmonizes with our Constitutional develop-
104 Hans A. Linde, Comments, 18 INT'L LAW 77, 78 (1984).
105 Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004).
106 Park, supra note 103, at 1243, citing Gordon Christenson, Using Human Rights
Law to Inform Due Process and Equal Protection Analyses, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 3
(1983).
107 Id. at 1243-44.
108 Id. at 1248.
109 In re Mahmoud El Abed Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
11o Id. at 411.
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ments."111 This line of legal reasoning helps provide the legal framework in
which human rights law can be implemented.
International law can also be used to help interpret vague Constitu-
tional provisions. For example, in Lareau v. Manson, n2 the Federal District
Court in Connecticut looked to international standards to give a fuller
meaning of the Eighth Amendment in terms of the treatment of prisoners,
resulting in an expansion of protections for prisoners. In doing so, the liti-
gants never argued that the treaties should be considered as binding law.
Moreover, in Fernandez v. Wilkinson,113 the Federal District Court in Kan-
sas cited the UDHR as an example of CIL. The UDHR helped the court
conclude that CIL was violated when the U.S. held a Cuban refugee - who
was determined not to be a security risk - in indeterminate detention.
International norms may help interpret more than criminal law. In
Doe v. Plyler,114 a Federal District Court in Texas cited Article 47 of the
Protocol of Buenos Aires1 15 (an amendment to the OAS Charter that the
U.S. ratified in 1970) as an indication of the U.S.' "commitment to ex-
panding educational opportunity."' 16 Citing to the Protocol of Buenos Aires
for support, the court held that a Texas statute that permitted only U.S.
citizens or lawfully admitted aliens to attend public schools for free violated
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.117
In addition to these federal court decisions, an increasing portion of
Supreme Court cases utilize IHRL as an interpretive tool. The opportunity
is not new. In 1949, for example, the Supreme Court referred to the UDHR
in upholding an amendment in Arizona's constitution that prohibited
closed-shop union arrangements.' Justice Frankfurter's concurring opin-
ion cited Article 20(2), which states that "[n]o one may be compelled to
belong to an association."'1 9 The more recent trend can be traced to the
1I Id.
112 507 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980), modified on other grounds, 651 F.2d 96
(2d Cir. 1981).
113 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), affid sub nom. on other grounds, Rodriguez-
Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
114 458 F. Supp 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), affid 457
U.S. 202 (1982).
115 Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, 6 I.L.M. 310.
116 458 F. Supp 569, 592 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
117 Id. at 592-93.
118 Am. Fed'n of Labor v. Am. Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949).
119 Id. at 549 n.5 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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developments concerning the use of the death penalty.1 20 In 1987, in the
case of Thompson v. Oklahoma,121 the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment was vio-
lated by the execution of a sixteen year-old convicted murderer. In its judg-
ment, the court used the ICCPR for its interpretive value, despite the fact
that at that time the U.S. had not signed or ratified the treaty. Later, in
2002, the Supreme Court looked to the world community to help it decide
that it was unconstitutional to apply the death penalty to mentally chal-
lenged criminals. In that case, Atkins v. Virginia, the court stated that
-within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for
crimes committed by mentally [challenged] offenders is overwhelmingly
disapproved. ' 122 Atkins illustrates how, depending on the case and the judi-
cial receptivity, litigating IHRL may be an effective strategy.
In 2005, only three years after Atkins, the court was faced with
another death penalty case. In Roper v. Simmons, 123 the court had to decide
the constitutionality of the execution of a juvenile who was under eighteen
years of age when he committed the crime. To help confirm their conclu-
sion, the court cited to international treaties such as the CRC and the
ICCPR as well as international opinion, which disapproves of the juvenile
death penalty.124 In looking outside of American law, the court explained
this was actually the American thing to do: "It does not lessen our fidelity
to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the ex-
press affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples
simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heri-
tage of freedom."' 125 Justice Scalia's dissent unsurprisingly criticized the
court for its reliance on international law, stating that
"'[a]cknowledgement' of foreign approval has no place in the legal opinion
of this Court unless it is part of the basis for the Court's judgment, which is
120 Yet the cases are not limited to those concerning the death penalty. For exam-
ple, "[t]wo of the court's landmark decisions, upholding the University of Michigan
Law School's affirmative action program and overturning a Texas anti-sodomy
statute, both cited human rights." FORD FOUNDATION, supra note 30, at 39.
121 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
122 536 U.S. 304, 347 n.21 (2002).
123 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
124 "The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does
provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions." Id. at
1200.
125 Id.
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surely what it parades as today." 126 Views like Scalia's are not uncommon
and continue to be an obstacle for lawyers advocating IHRL.
In order to have an impact on the lives of ordinary Americans, how-
ever, the more substantive law to interpret exists at the state level. There-
fore, because there are more positive rights in state laws and constitutions
than in federal statutes and the U.S. Constitution, IHRL advocacy at the
state level would have a broader effect.
3. Treaties as a Defense
Using IHRL as an interpretive tool is not the only option. Litigants
may use a treaty as a defense, a route usually taken in a criminal prosecu-
tion. The defensive use of a treaty is not only permissible but advisable
when a defendant is facing, for example, an unfair trial or the unfair imposi-
tion of the death penalty. 127 For instance, in United States v. Benitez,128 the
district court accepted the defendant's use of the ICCPR as part of his de-
fense, although the court ultimately rejected the defense based on the partic-
ular facts of the case. 129
C. Federal Statutory Jurisdiction
1. Alien Tort Claims Act
The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) 130 grants original jurisdiction to
federal district courts for "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, com-
mitted in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."' 1
The unanimous decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,132 sparked a new light in
human rights litigation by using this 1789 statute to sue foreign human
rights abusers in federal court. In the case, the Filartigas - a Paraguayan
doctor and his daughter - brought an ATCA claim against Pena-Irala, an-
other Paraguayan in a New York District Court for "wrongfully causing the
126 Id. at 1229 (emphasis in original). See also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 869 n.4 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[W]here there is not first a settled
consensus among our own people, the views of other nations, however enlightened
the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon
Americans.").
127 Wilson, supra note 55.
128 28 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1363 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
129 Id.
130 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (1982).
131 Id.
132 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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death of Dr. Filartiga's seventeen-year old son, Joelito." 133 The Filartigas
alleged that in 1976 Pena-Irala, who at that time was Inspector General of
Police in Asuncion, Paraguay, had kidnapped Joelito and tortured him to
death. The Second Circuit held that conduct, such as "an act of torture
committed by a state official against one held in detention" 134 violates the
law of nations and international human rights law. 135
The viability of ATCA suits was reaffirmed in 2004 by the Su-
preme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. 136 The Sosa Court up-
held Filartiga and subsequent ATCA cases that have claimed violations of
"specific, universal and obligatory" norms. 37 Despite the Supreme Court's
stamp of approval, however, there exist various statutory and practical hur-
dles in bringing an ATCA claim. For one, victims must demonstrate that
"the abuses fit within a fairly narrow set of the most horrendous forms of
human rights violations." 138 Secondly, the ATCA only provides aliens, as
opposed to U.S. citizens, the right to sue their perpetrators. Thirdly, the
federal laws of personal jurisdiction require that the perpetrator reside in the
U.S., have significant contacts, or is served with the lawsuit while they are
present in the U.S. Moreover, not only are ATCA cases expensive to pur-
sue, there is no guarantee that the victim will receive any damages. 139 All
of these hurdles help explain why there have only been a relatively small
number of cases actually litigated, less than one hundred since the 1980
landmark decision in Filartiga.140 Of these cases, only 19 parties have suc-
cessfully sued for damages. 141
133 Id. at 878.
134 Id. at 880.
135 Id.
136 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
137 Id. at 748.
138 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: PROMOTING ACCOUNTA-
BILITY AND LIMITING IMPUNITY FOR SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (Mar.
2004), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.com [hereinafter PROMOTING
ACCOUNTABILITY].
139 "Plaintiffs and attorneys have had a difficult time enforcing these judgments in
the past, either because (a) the defendant does not have assets, or (b) the defendant
has assets but has hidden them in another country." CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY, INFORMATION CJA NEEDS TO FILE A LAWSUIT AGAINST HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSERS WHO LIVE IN OR VISIT THE UNITED STATES, available at http:/I
www.cja.org.
140 PROMOTING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 138.
141 Id.
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The types of norms the courts have accepted and denied reflect the
parameters of what are considered universal norms. The right not to be
tortured or subjected to arbitrary imprisonment "are more readily accepted
as fundamental human rights than are the rights to subsistence benefits,
shelter, health care, or education."' 142 For example, federal courts have held
that the following violations may serve as a basis for a claim under ATCA:
summary execution and killing;143 torture;144 arbitrary, prolonged detention,
disappearance and kidnapping; 145 war crimes; genocide; 146 slavery and/or
forced labor; 147 crimes against humanity; 148 systematic racial discrimina-
tion; 149 and the denial of political rights.150 By contrast, courts have held
that the following conduct does not violate the law of nations and thus are
not actionable under ATCA: cultural genocide and environmental
abuses; 151 cruel and inhuman treatment and the failure of sustainable devel-
opment; 152 child custody disputes; terrorism; libel and free speech; 153 negli-
gence; 154 and fraud. 155
2. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991
The Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) 156 of 1991 was signed
into law by President Bush in 1992 and extended the ATCA by providing
similar rights to both U.S. citizens and non-citizens. It allows individuals to
sue their perpetrators for acts of torture 157 or extrajudicial killing158 suffered
142 Park, supra note 103, at 1242.
143 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
" Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
145 Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994).
146 Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC., 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
147 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
148 Doe I v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1998).
19 Kadic, 70 F.3d 232.
150 Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
151 Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
152 Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC., 221 F. Supp 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
153 Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Cal. 1986).
154 Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
155 Abiodun v. Martin Oil Serv., Inc., 475 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1973).
156 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)).
157 ([A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering.. whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on [an] individual . when
such pain or suffering is inflicted by, or at the instigation of, or
with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity.).
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in another country by officials acting under the "color of law" of a foreign
sovereign. The ATCA and the TVPA are two exceptional statutes that en-
able victims to hold their perpetrators accountable for their horrendous acts.
One negative aspect of both statutes is that many valid human rights abuses
will not be adequate for such litigation because of the difficulty of personal
jurisdiction requirements of the federal courts, even if the abuser occasion-
ally visits the U.S. "it may be impossible to determine their itinerary with
enough time to prepare and file a lawsuit."' 15 9 When this can be ascertained,
however, both statutes exemplify what may well be the only federal statu-
tory jurisdiction for litigating human rights violations in federal courts.
3. The Antiterrorism Act of 1990 and the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act
The Antiterrorism Act of 1990160 provides the right for any U.S.
national to sue in federal district court for damages resulting from an act of
international terrorism. 161 However, the Act forbids suits against govern-
ment officials acting in their official capacity. Along the same lines, the
1996 Amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 162 al-
lows for civil suits for "torture, extrajudicial killing, and other abuses
against a small group of foreign governments."' 163 It allows U.S. citizens to
sue "but only when the defendant government is on the U.S. government's
list of foreign states designated as 'state sponsors of terrorism.' ,164 With
this limitation, these statutes provide a very limited number of Americans
the ability to sue in federal courts using IHRL.
The ATCA, TVPA, the Antiterrorism Act of 1990, and the 1996
amendment to FSIA are the only statutorily granted causes of action availa-
ble to individuals wanting to sue perpetrators of human rights abuses in
U.S. federal courts. Nevertheless, human rights scholars and lawyers con-
Id.
158 Extrajudicial killing is considered to be any murder or execution by a person
acting in an official capacity without legal authority.
159 BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTs LITIGA-
TION IN U.S. COURTS 225 (1996).
160 18 U.S.C §§ 2331-38 (2005).
161 Id. §§ 2333-38.
162 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2005).
163 Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law
Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27
YALE. J. INT'L L. 1, 9-10 (2002) (citation omitted).
164 Id.
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stantly propose new avenues.165 These statutorily created civil remedies are
a necessity, particularly when the U.S. government refuses to criminally
prosecute human rights abusers that travel or reside in the U.S. 166 As admi-
rable as the federal statutes are, their reach is only to aliens or Americans
who were affected abroad. Similarly, their breadth is only to the most hor-
rible human rights abuses. Additional human right norms - such as eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights - are not subject matters capable of
litigation through these statutes. At the end of the day, there are no federal
statutes that allow U.S. citizens to benefit from the protections afforded by
IHRL, unless their human rights were violated outside of the U.S.
IV. STATE COURT USE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND IHRL
Human rights attorneys look to international norms because they
often surpass U.S. and state constitutional rights. Because these domestic
protections define "minimum standards," 167 international instruments "may
be invoked only in so far as they equal or surpass domestic standards." 168
In order to invoke these norms in state courts, one must know how interna-
tional law applies to the states. The U.S. Constitution and the laws of the
165 One example is using the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to incorporate
international human rights norms. See Martin A. Geer, Human Rights in Our Own
Backyard: Incorporating International Human Rights Protections Under Domestic
Civil Rights Law - A Case Study of Women in United States Prisons, 13 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 71 (2000).
166 Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of
Human Rights Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments Conven-
tion, 42 HARV. INT'L L. J. 141, 148-49 (2001).
(In contrast to some other common law jurisdictions, there are no
significant criminal cases for torture and crimes against humanity
in the United States despite the legality of such prosecutions.
Pursuant to [CAT], the United States enacted a statute authoriz-
ing the exercise of universal jurisdiction by U.S. courts over tor-
ture committed extraterritorially. The statute grants jurisdiction
where the alleged offender is a national of the United States or
where the alleged offender is present in the United States, regard-
less of the nationality of either victim or offender. However, de-
spite receiving credible information about the presence of human
rights abusers within the United States, this statute has yet to be
utilized.).
167 Paul Hoffman, The Application of International Human Rights Law in State
Courts: A View from California, 18 INT'L LAW 61, 65 (1984).
168 Id.
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nation are the supreme laws to which the states are bound. Each time the
Senate has given its advice and consent to ratify a major human rights
treaty, it has done so with an understanding that different levels of govern-
ments (federal, state, local) may be responsible for fulfilling the mandates
of the instrument. For example, the U.S. declared the following when it
signed the ICCPR:
That the United States understands that this Covenant shall
be implemented by the Federal Government to the extent
that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the
matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and lo-
cal governments; to the extent that state and local govern-
ments exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal
Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal
system to the end that the competent authorities of the state
or local governments may take appropriate measures for the
fulfillment of the Covenant. 169
However, neither federal nor state governments give enough effect to
IHRL, despite the U.S.' stated understanding that they must/may. The
Human Rights Committee, the U.N. body that oversees the implementation
of the ICCPR, found that the report prepared by the U.S. to the HRC con-
tained "comprehensive information on the laws and regulations giving ef-
fect to the rights provided in the Covenant at the federal level,"' 170 yet it
"contained few references to the implementation of Covenant rights at the
state level."'17 1 As discussed above, treaties have not been implemented at
the federal level, for Congress has consistently refused to do so when ratify-
ing the treaties. Because of this failure on the part of the legislative branch,
implementation relies on the judicial leadership at state and federal levels.
This Part will discuss how state courts have treated the three differ-
ent ways in which human rights treaties can be used in courts: (a) actual
application of the treaty; (b) defensive use; and (c) as an interpretive aid.
A. State Court Decisions Denying the Applicability of IHRL
The seminal case for the principle that human rights instruments are
non-self-executing, and hence cannot be directly applied, stems from a dicta
169 U.S. RESERVATIONS, DECLARATIONS, AND UNDERSTANDINGS, ICCPR, 138
CONG. REc. S4781, S4784 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
170 Comments on United States of America, Human Rights Comm., 53rd Sess.,
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statement made by the California Supreme Court in the 1952 case of Sei
Fujii v. California.172 In Sei Fujii, the court rejected the appellate court's
finding that the California Alien Land Law violated the non-discrimination
provisions of Articles 1, 55, and 56 of the U.N. Charter. The court stated,
in dictum, that the human rights articles of the U.N. Charter were non-self-
executing because they "lack the mandatory quality and definiteness which
would indicate an intent to create justiciable rights in private persons imme-
diately upon ratification."1 73 Other state courts have followed Sei Fujii's
example in denying the binding force of the U.N. Charter.
Lawyers in death penalty cases often cite to international standards,
with little avail. Both the California Court of Appeals, in People v.
Barnes,174 and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, in Wynn v. State,175
rejected the provision in the CRC that banned life imprisonment or the exe-
cution of minors. In addition, in Domingues v. Nevada,176 the Nevada Su-
preme Court held that "the Senate's express reservation of the [U.S.] right
to impose a penalty of death on juvenile offenders negates Domingues'
claim that he was illegally sentenced" in violation of Article 6(5) of the
ICCPR, which bars the execution of juveniles under age 18.177 However, a
dissenting justice in Domingues was concerned that the Senate's reservation
was invalid, because "Article 4(2) of the treaty states that there shall be no
derogation from Article 6 which includes the prohibition on the execution
of juvenile offenders."' 178 Although the case exemplifies how many state
judges are reluctant to give effect to the purpose and meaning of interna-
tional human rights treaties, the dissent may indicate the possibility for
courts to analyze the legality of the Senate's reservations to a treaty.
This last case shows that litigation "might better focus on the use of
treaty provisions to which no reservation has been taken." 179 Moreover,
these cases can be distinguished from the cases that do use IHRL because
the U.S. had made a reservation in the ICCPR that specifically indicates its
intent to use the death penalty on juveniles. On the other hand, as discussed
earlier, the Supreme Court has disregarded this reservation and held, in
172 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
173 Id. at 622.
174 2002 WL 53230, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2002).
175 804 So.2d 1122, 1145 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).
176 961 P.2d 1279 (1998).
177 Id.
178 Id. at 1280 (Rose, J., dissenting).
179 Wilson, supra note 55, at 56. See also William Schabas, Invalid Reservations
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States
Still a Part?, 21 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 277 (1995).
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Roper v. Simmons,180 that the juvenile death penalty is unconstitutional,
thereby reversing the above-mentioned state cases.' 8'
B. State Court Decisions Accepting the Applicability of IHRL
In 2003, the Supreme Court declined to hear the case of a Mexican
national, Osbaldo Torres, whose VCCR right to assistance from the Mexi-
can consulate was violated by the U.S.182 Yet, in 2004, the ICJ upheld
Torres' claims. 183 On May, 13, 2004, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals was prompted by the ICJ decision to halt Torres' execution, thereby
treating a U.S. treaty as binding law. 184 The same day, Oklahoma Governor
Brad Henry commuted Torres' sentence, making reference to the ICJ's
ruling.185
In Sterling v. Cupp,186 the Oregon Supreme Court relied on almost
half a dozen human rights instruments to interpret a state constitutional pro-
vision regarding the treatment of prisoners. 187 The court held that the state
constitution was violated by a law that allowed female prison officers to
supervise male prison inmates. In reaching its conclusion, the court cited
the U.N. Charter, the UDHR, the ICCPR, the American Convention, and
the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, approved by
the U.N. Economic and Social Council. 188
In Boehm v. Superior Court,18 9 the California Court of Appeals re-
lied on Article 25 of the UDHR to interpret a state statutory duty to support
the poor. 190 The court held that a reduction in general assistance benefits
180 125 S. Ct. 1183.
181 Id. at 1194 ("The reservation to Article 6(5) of the ICCPR provides minimal
evidence that there is not now a national consensus against juvenile executions.").
182 Torres v. Oklahoma, 525 U.S. 1082, 119 S. Ct. 826.
183 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. LEXIS 11
(Mar. 31).
184 Torres v. State, 2004 WL 3711623 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004).
185 Tony Mauro, The World According to the Supreme Court, LEGAL TIMES, Nov.
22, 2004, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1100535371397.
186 625 P.2d 123 (Or. 1981) (en banc).
187 Id.
188 Id. at 132.
189 223 Cal. Rptr. 716 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
190 UDHR, supra note 34, at art. 25(1) provides that:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well being of himself and of his family, including
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment,
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was "arbitrar[y] and capricious[ ]" where the county fixed its grant "without
considering the recipients' need for a clothing, transportation and medical
care allowance." 91 The court used the UDHR for help articulating that
"common sense and all notions of human dignity" would require a mini-
mum level of subsistence. 192
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of liveli-
hood in circumstances beyond his control.
9 Boehm, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
92 Id. at 721.
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TABLE 3
A SAMPLE OF STATE COURT CASES THAT USED IHRL TO GIVE
CONTEXTUAL SUPPORT TO THEIR HOLDINGS
Right to Privacy In City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson,193 the California Supreme Court
cited language from the UDHR in discussion of California's
constitutional amendment recognizing a right to pnvacy in one's family
as well as in one's home.
Right to Freedom In American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment and Housing
from Comm'n,194 the California Supreme Court noted the relevance of the
Discrimination UDHR to a discrimination claim based on disability.
Right to Freedom The California Appellate Court, in In Re White, 195 cited to the UDHR
of Movement provision on freedom of movement within a state in striking down a
term of probation prohibiting a former prostitute from entering certain
neighborhoods.
Right to The West Virginia Supreme Court, in Pauley v. Kelly, 196 cited the
Education UDHR for the proposition that education is a fundamental right.
Criminal Justice Commonwealth v. Edward Sadler197 cited the UDHR to support the
holding that the state had an obligation to educate juveniles in custody.
Right to Basic In Boehm v. Superior Court,198 the California Court of Appeals cited
Human Needs the UDHR to support its finding that it was inhumane for Cahfornia to
exempt allowances for clothing, transportation or medical care from its
calculation of payment rates for general relief.
Parental Rights In an action to terminate parental rights, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court, in New Hampshire v. Robert H.,199 cited the ICCPR and
ICESCR to stand for the proposition that parental nghts are natural and
inherent under the state's constitution.
Children's Rights An Ohio court, in In re Julie Anne,200 restrained the parents of a minor
child from smoking, or allowing anyone else to smoke, anywhere in
the presence of the child. The court supported its decision by the
CRC's "obligation to ensure children's right to the highest attainable
standard of health, '201 and found that "involuntary harmful exposure of
children to secondhand smoke can be seen as a human rights
violation." 20 2 In Batista v. Batista,203 the Connecticut Superior Court
found it embarrassing that the U.S. had not signed the CRC, and held,
in accordance with the CRC, that the child's wishes should be taken
into consideration in a custody proceeding.
193 610 P.2d 436, 439 n.2 (Cal. 1980); see also Humphers v. First Interstate Bank,
696 P.2d 527, 531 n.7 (Or. 1985) (en banc).
194 651 P.2d 1151, 1154 n.4 (Cal. 1982).
195 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 567 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); see also Eggert v. City of
Seattle, 505 P.2d 801, 802 (Wash. 1973) (en banc).
196 255 S.E.2d 859, 864, n.5 (W. Va. 1979); see also Sheridan Rd. Baptist Church
v. Dep't of Educ., 396 N.W.2d 373, 408 n.30 (Mich. 1986).
197 3 Phila. Co. Rptr. 316, 330 (Pa. Com. P1. 1979).
198 223 Cal. Rptr. 716, 721 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
199 393 A.2d 1387, 1390 (N.H. 1978).
200 780 N.E.2d 635 (Ohio Ct. Corn. P1. 2002).
201 Id. at 652.
202 Id.
203 6 Conn. L. Rptr. 512, 1992 WL 156171 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992).
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DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINIONS
Right to be Justice Newman's dissenting opinion in Cramer v. Tyars20 4 cited
Protected from the UDHR to support his conclusion that the questioning of a
Cruel and Unusual mentally challenged person by the prosecution in a hearing
Punishment regarding his committal was "cruel and degrading."
20 5
Right to Welfare In his concurring opinion in Moore v. Ganim,20 6 Chief Justice
Peters cited the UDHR to support his conclusion that Connecticut's
Constitution included a right to welfare.
V. ANALYSIS
As described above, litigating IHRL in federal courts has had
mixed results. Gross violations of human rights, usually committed abroad
or affecting aliens - such as torture and extrajudicial killings - have their
proper place in federal courts because of the protected jurisdiction found in
statutory causes of action. In addition, even if a federal court refuses to
directly enforce a non-self-executing treaty, it often uses IHRL as an inter-
pretive tool. However, the range of rights to interpret is narrow; stronger
positive rights to interpret exist at the state level. In light of these limita-
tions, positive rights-based claims can be most effectively argued and pro-
moted in state courts. This Part will analyze the doctrinal and normative
arguments for and against using state courts to enforce IHRL.
A. Doctrinal Arguments
1. Human Rights Abuses Occurring in the State are Treated as State
Constitutional Violations
Many state constitutions go beyond the floor of rights required by
the federal Constitution. Moreover, some international human rights norms
are broader than what the Constitution provides. 207 In its first report to the
HRC regarding its compliance with the ICCPR, the U.S. declared that the
federal government was
204 558 P.2d 793 (Cal. 1979) (Newman, J., dissenting).
205 Id. at 799.
206 660 A.2d 742, 781 (Conn. 1995) (Peters, C.J., concurring):
([a]lthough the [U.S.] is not a party to the International Covenant,
and although no right to subsistence may yet apply to this country
as part of customary international law, the wide international
agreement on at least the hortatory goals identified in the human
rights documents strongly supports the plaintiffs' claim.).
(citation omitted).
207 Hoffman, supra note 167; see also TABLE 2: AREAS WHERE IHRL PROVIDES
BROADER PROTECTIONS THAN U.S. LAW, supra text Part III(A).
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a government of limited authority and responsibility . . .
[and that] state and local governments exercise significant
responsibilities in many areas, including matters such as
education, public health, business organization, work con-
ditions, marriage and divorce, the care of children and the
exercise of the ordinary police power . . . Some areas
covered by the [ICCPR] fall into this category. 208
State governments, in contrast to the federal government, can and do pro-
vide their citizens' basic needs in ways that the federal government cannot.
As a result, one can challenge a human rights violation in state court, alleg-
ing a violation of a state, as opposed to federal, constitutional or statutory
provision. Furthermore, in contrast to the federal courts, "state courts have
been more progressive in providing for protection for basic needs" 209 be-
cause state courts may supplement the federal constitutional minimum stan-
dards "through interpretation of their own constitutional or statutory
standards. '210 These constitutions and statutes are exactly where IHRL can
be utilized for their interpretive value.
States have begun to realize that their state constitutions are often
more protective of civil liberties and positive rights than the Supreme Court
has interpreted the U.S. Constitution to be. Consequently, "many state su-
preme courts have become receptive forums for civil liberties arguments
that the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected. '211 For example, in 1991, a
Michigan appellate court struck down a voter-approved ban on state-funded
abortions for poor women.212 The court held that the ban violated the
state's equal protection clause by discriminating against women who exer-
cise their fundamental right to have an abortion. The court was able to base
their holding on the fact that the case concerned provisions of Michigan's
Constitution, which they "are free to read more broadly and analyze differ-
ently than those of the federal constitution. '" 213 Although the Michigan Su-
preme Court later reversed this decision, the appellate decision reflects how
208 Initial Reports of State Parties Due in 1993, CCPR/C/81/Add.4 (Aug. 24, 1994)
(submitted by the U.S.).
209 Park, supra note 103, at 1255.
210 Id.
211 Milo Geyelin & Ellen Joan Pollack, Pennsylvania High Court Tightens Rules
on Police Seizure of Evidence, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 1991, at B4.
212 Doe v. Dir. of Dep't of Soc. Serv., 468 N.W.2d 862 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
213 Id. at 875.
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state constitutional rights may be interpreted to be broader than those in the
U.S. Constitution.214
State courts have recognized a right to education that the U.S. Su-
preme Court has said does not exist in the U.S. Constitution. For example,
the West Virginia court in Pauley v. Kelly215 held that education is a funda-
mental right. To support its holding, the court cited to the UDHR, which
they noted "appears to proclaim education to be a fundamental right of eve-
ryone, at least on this planet. ' 216 Sixteen years later, in February 2005, the
state of New York found the right to education in their constitution. Justice
Leland DeGrasse of the State Supreme Court in Manhattan ruled that "an
additional $5.6 billion must be spent on the city's public schoolchildren
every year to ensure them the opportunity for a sound basic education that
they are guaranteed under the State Constitution. '217 Perhaps the more sig-
nificant part of the ruling is that Justice DeGrasse "ordered a specific
amount of money to be spent on the city's schools," 218 reflecting one way a
court can decide how to properly enforce positive rights.219
2. Human Rights Abuses Committed Abroad by a State Citizen or
Corporation
Globalization and the influx of corporations doing business in other
countries suggests the need for the "creative use of the law to hold multina-
tional corporations accountable" 220 for their human rights abuses. In fact,
this avenue of litigation "may be as important as holding individual perpe-
trators and governments accountable for their actions. 2 21 State courts may
hear a case where a state citizen or corporation is sued for human rights
violations committed abroad. This entails the extraterritorial application of
the state's tort laws. For example, a state corporation that sells products
214 Doe v. Dep't of Soc. Services, 487 N.W.2d 166 (Mich. 1992).
215 255 S.E. 2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
216 Id. at 865 n.5.
217 Greg Winter, Judge Orders Billions in Aid to City Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
15, 2005, at Al.
218 Id.
219 Id. ("With that step, the courts have moved into a realm that is usually the
closely defended prerogative of lawmakers.").
220 STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 159, at 230.
221 Id.
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abroad with the knowledge that they will be used to harm third parties may
be held liable under domestic tort laws. 222
This type of litigation can also be referred to as "transitory torts."
In this type of case, a plaintiff would file in state court a tort that parallels
the sorts of international human rights protected under ATCA or the TVPA.
This doctrine provides that
civil actions for personal injury torts are transitory in that
the tortfeasor's wrongful acts create an obligation which
follows him across national boundaries. If personal juris-
diction is obtained over the defendant, if his acts violate the
law of the situs state, and if the polices of the forum state
are consistent with the foreign law, then the exercise of ju-
risdiction is proper.223
Thus, the state may have subject matter jurisdiction over torts that were
committed in another country, and would merely need to have personal ju-
risdiction over the defendant to be able to hear the case.
The April 2005 settlement of a federal and a state case might in fact
be the leading cases in this development. The state case of Doe v. Uno-
ca1224 mirrored the federal case of the same name225 and brought an ATCA
claim against Unocal. However, the state case pled the case according to
state law and alleged no violations of IHRL. In the case, Burmese victims
sued Unocal for their complicity in using slave labor to make a pipeline in
Burma. The victims claimed that Unocal violated a California business and
professional code whereby a corporation may be held liable for the unlaw-
ful results of its business practices. The plaintiffs also included claims of
wrongful death, battery, false imprisonment, assault, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence,
and the violation of California Constitution Article 1, § 6 prohibiting slav-
222 See Zeinah v. Fed. Lab., Inc., Civ. No. 91-2148 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 1992)
(holding that the complaint alleging negligent sale of tear gas states a claim for
relief).
223 Jeffery M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over Interna-
tional Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-
Rala, 22 HARV. INT'L L. J. 53, 63 (1981), citing Slater v. Mex. Nat'l Ry. Co., 194
U.S. 120 (1904); McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. 241, 248-49 (1843); Filartiga, 630 F.2d
at 885.
224 Doe v. Unocal Corp., Case Nos. BC 237980 & BC 237679 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2004)
(the court denied Unocal's motion for summary judgment.).
225 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacating as moot, 2005
WL 843914.
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ery. State Superior Court Judge Victoria Gerard Chaney not only refused to
dismiss the case, but she also refused Unocal's request to apply Burmese
law on public policy grounds because Burmese law would not recognize the
forced labor claim.
Even though the federal courts "would have diversity jurisdiction
over those causes of action involving an alien and a U.S. citizen, ' 226 ATCA-
like actions might be an option in state courts. The Ninth Circuit acknowl-
edged this possibility in Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos.227 Moreover,
in Yosofa Alomang v. Freeport-McMoran,228 a Federal District Judge in
Texas remanded to state court a suit that alleged an American mining com-
pany's involvement in the perpetration of human rights abuses in Burma. 229
Thus, although the case involved the violation of international human rights
treaties and foreign environmental damages, the case remained in state
court by concentrating on the suit's state personal injury torts.2 30
226 STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 159, at 36 (citation omitted). See Linder v.
Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332 (1 lth Cir. 1992); In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights
Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (case of Jaime Piopongco).
227 25 F.3d 1467, 1476 n.10 (9th Cir. 1994).
Though not raised by the parties, the plaintiffs may also state a
cause of action for violations of municipal law. See Estate I, 978
F.2d at 503 (Trajano's claims against Marcos-Manotoc arose
under wrongful death statutes as well as international law). See
generally Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 782-88 (Edwards, J.) (substan-
tive right could be derived from the domestic tort law of the
United States if there is a nexus between the international tort
providing jurisdiction and the domestic law tort providing the
cause of action, and if limited to actions constituting universal
crimes, domestic torts committed within the United States and
injuring rights under international law, and torts committed by
United States citizens abroad). We do not decide this issue.
Id.
228 Alomang v. Freeport-McMoran Inc., 1996 WL 601431 (E.D. La. Oct. 17,
1996).
229 Id.
230 Alomang v. Freeport-McMoran Inc., 811 So. 2d 98 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (af-
firming the district court's dismissal of the action); see also Michael Swan, Interna-
tional Human Rights Tort Claims and the Experience of United States Courts: An
Introduction to the US Case Law, Key Statutes and Doctrines, in TORTURE AS TORT
66-67 (Craig Scott ed., 2001).
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3. IHRL Can Inform Judges' Decisions in Interpreting State Law
A human rights lawyer may persuade a state judge to look to IHRL
as a tool in interpreting the state's constitution and statutes. The litigant
does not need to argue that the human right law is binding on the court, but
can use it as persuasive authority for the desired result. For example, al-
though all fifty state constitutions provide a right to education, 231 interna-
tional treaties and the jurisprudence of human rights institutions may
provide the court with a fuller meaning of the right. 23 2 Subject matters
often found in state laws that can benefit from the wider amplification sup-
plied by international norms include health and medical care, 23 3 children, 23 4
welfare and social security, 23 5 discrimination against women, 236 homosexu-
als,237 minorities,23 8 the death penalty, 239 civil and political rights, 240 and
231 ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art.
XI, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; COLO. CONST. art.
IX, § 2; CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX,
§ 1; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1;
ILL. CONST. art. X, §1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. IX, 2(D), § 3;
KAN. CONST. art. VI; Ky. CONST. art. 183; LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME. CONST.
art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2;
MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; MIss. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 201; Mo. CONST. art. IX, § I(A); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. VII,
§ 1; NEv. CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII; N.J. CONST. art.
VIII, § 4; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX,
§ 2; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; OIo CONST. art. VI, § 3; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII,
§ 1; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1;
S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12;
TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 68; VA.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; WIs.
CONST. art. X, § 3; Wyo. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
232 See ICESCR, supra note 36, at art. 13.
233 See id. art. 12.
234 See generally CAT, supra note 64; UDHR, supra note 34; U.N. Charter, supra
note 53.
235 See ICESCR, supra note 36, at arts. 9, 10(2), 11.
236 See CEDAW, supra note 58; ICESCR, supra note 36, at art. 3; ICCPR, supra
note 31, at art. 3.
237 See Toonen v. Australia, Views of the Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No.
488/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (Mar. 31, 1994) (finding that arts.
2(1) and 17(1) of the ICCPR were violated by Australia's anti-gay law); Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (citing a decision from the European Court of
Human Rights in striking down Texas' anti-sodomy law under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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economic and social rights such as the right to adequate food.241 Moreover,
using IHRL as an interpretive tool is practical even though it is not binding,
because "[i]f a court uses human rights law to reach a decision in your
favor, it doesn't matter very much what the legal status of the international
norm is."242 The following chart provides an example of how these rights
can be used to help interpret affirmative rights embraced in various state
constitutions.
238 See ICCPR, supra note 31, at art. 27 (providing that "[i]n those States in which
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities
shall not be denied the right . to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise
their own religion, or to use their own language.").
239 See Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Art. 6, G.A. Res. 44/128 (Dec. 15,
1989) (referring "generally to abolition in terms which strongly suggest that aboli-
tion is desirable.").
240 See generally, ICCPR, supra note 31; UDHR, supra note 34; U.N. Charter,
supra note 53.
241 See generally ICESCR, supra note 36, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights, General Comment No. 12, UN Doc.E/C.12/1999/5 (1999) (stating that art.
1 I's provision for the right to adequate food, "like any other human right, imposes
three types or levels of obligations on State parties: the obligations to respect, to
protect, and to fulfill") (emphasis added).
242 Hoffman, supra note 167, at 63.
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TABLE 4
A SAMPLE OF POSITIVE RIGHTS FOUND IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Alabama "The state ... may acquire, build, establish, own, operate and maintain
hospitals, health centers, sanatoria and other health facilities."2 4 3Requires
the counties to make "adequate provision for the maintenance of the
poor."
2 44
California Authorizes aid to abandoned children, aged persons in indigent
circumstances, needy blind persons, needy physically handicapped
persons, minor orphans, and children of a father who is incapacitated for
work.
245
Colorado Promises to provide an old-age pension to all residents sixty years of
age and older.
24 6
Georgia Authorizes the legislature to provide medical and other care for the
indigent sick and to support paupers.
2 47
Idaho State has a duty to establish and support such charitable educational,
and penal institutions as the public good may require.24
8
Louisiana Legislature may "establish a system of economic and social welfare,
unemployment compensation, and public health."
2 49
Massachusetts Guarantee of food and shelter in times of emergency.
250
Mississippi Duty to provide for the treatment and care of the insane, an
authorization to provide for the indigent sick in state hospitals and to
provide homes for persons who may have claims upon society.
2 5 1
Montana Provides children with fundamental rights "unless specifically precluded
by laws which enhance [their] protection." 25 2State obligation to provide
such economic assistance and social and rehabilitative services for those
who, "by reason of age, infirmities, or misfortune are determined by the
legislature to be in need."
2 53
New York Requirement that "the aid, care and support of the needy are public
concerns and shall be provided by the state." 2 54The legislature may
provide housing for the poor.
255
North Carolina Caring for the poor is "one of the first duties of a civilized and a
Christian state."
256
Oklahoma State must establish and support educational, reformatory and penal
institutions and those with special needs, and others as the public good
requires.25 7Legislation may be enacted to care for the elderly who are in
need and cannot provide for themselves.
2 5 8
Wyoming Requires the state to establish and support such charitable institutions as
the claims of humanity and the public good may require.
2 59
243 ALA. CONST. amend. 53.
244 Id. at art. IV, § 88.
245 CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 3.
246 COLO. CONST. art. XXIV.
247 GA. CONST. art. III, § IX, para. VI(i).
248 IDAHO CONST. art. X.
249 LA. CONST. art. XII, § 8.
250 MASS. CONST. art. XLVII.
251 Miss. CONST. art. IV, § 86; Miss. CONST. art. XIV, § 262.
252 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 15.
253 Id. at art. VII, § 3.
254 N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
255 Id. at art. XVIII.
256 N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
257 OKLA. CONST. art. XXI, § 1.
258 Id. at art. XXV, § 1.
259 WYo. CONST. art. VII, § 18.
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4. State Courts May Use Customary International Law
Because a state court can utilize CIL, the litigant need not worry if
the U.S. has not signed a particular treaty, or if a non-self-executing clause
has been attached to a treaty the U.S. has ratified. A human rights lawyer
may utilize CIL in three ways: (1) by arguing that CIL provides, as dictated
by The Paquete Habana,260 an independent body of law that binds U.S.
courts; (2) by arguing that the CIL constitutes jus cogens;261 or (3) by ask-
ing the court to use CIL as a tool to interpret U.S. law.2 62
Many important rights in the UDHR have evolved into CIL and are
ripe for use by state courts in interpreting state laws. Generally speaking,
the following jus cogens offenses constitute CIL: "(a) genocide, (b) slavery
or slave trade, (c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals,
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention, (f) systematic racial discrimination, or (g)
a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights. '263 Although states may use CIL, the opportunity to do so may not
arrive for many years since many positive rights have not yet been consid-
ered CIL, and the cases that claim a violation of rights already recognized
as CIL would most likely be suitable for an ATCA or TVPA suit. Moreo-
ver, the dilemma of how to deal with a conflict between CIL and a differing
state law has proven to be a challenge for human rights litigators, who in-
stead choose "to present international norms for their interpretive value
rather than their preemptive force. '' 264 Therefore, CIL may carry as much
force as international treaties.
5. Non-self-executing Treaties Can be Used to Interpret State Laws and
as a Defense in State Courts
The non-self-executing declaration often attached by the Senate to
human rights treaties does not signify that theses treaties lack legal impor-
260 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (holding that "[i]ntemational law is part of our law
[and that] where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations.").
261 Jus cogens are fundamental principles of intemational law that allow no
derogation.
262 Sandra L. Babcock, International Law in Capital Cases (Last Updated August
2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/hrc/DP-Babcock.pdf.
263 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (1987).
264 Joan Fitzpatrick, The Preemptive and Interpretive Force of International
Human Rights Law in State Courts, 90 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 262, 265 (1996).
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tance in state courts. These declarations are simply the Senate's way of
saying that human rights treaties do not create a private cause of action in
U.S. courts until Congress legislatively implements those rights into U.S.
law. Consequently, "[t]his leaves unaffected such possibilities as reference
to treaty norms in interpreting state law [and] reliance on treaty provisions
as a defense in state litigation. ' 265 It can be cogently argued that a private
cause of action, which is prohibited when a treaty is non-self-executing, is
not synonymous with a defense, and is permitted under the treaty. 266 More-
over, state courts can follow the lead of some federal courts in accepting
non-self-executing treaties when used for the purposes of defense.267
B. Normative Arguments
1. Substantive Importance of Policy Making in U.S. State Courts
State courts are often overlooked despite the important role they
play in the creation of substantive policies that affect American citizens on
an individual and local level. Because of this unique feature of state courts,
human rights attorneys should press state courts to use IHRL. Furthermore,
state courts should accept these arguments because the norms and jurispru-
dence found in IHRL provide a legal framework that can help judges inter-
pret the positive rights included in their own constitutions. In the U.S., the
bulk of the judicial workload - over 99 percent - occurs at the state rather
than federal level, with 95 percent of U.S. judges working at the state
level. 268 Moreover, it is not just the sheer size of the state judicial system
that is significant; it is also the fact "that the decisions of state jurists fre-
quently have a great impact on public policy. ' ' 269 State courts utilizing
265 Id. at 264.
266 Christian A. Levesque, The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: A Primer for Raising a Defense Against the Juvenile Death Penalty in
Federal Courts, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 755, 776 (2001).
267 See Part III(B), supra text and accompanying notes.
268 ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA 84
(2001) [hereinafter CARP & STIDHAM], citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 37 (1996).
269 For example, during the 1970s a number of suits were brought
into federal court challenging the constitutionality of a state's
spending vastly unequal sums on the education of its schoolchil-
dren . . The litigants claimed that children in the poorer dis-
tricts were victims of unlawful discrimination in violation of their
equal protection rights under the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme
Court said they were not, however, in a conservative-doinated
five-to-four decision. [San Antonio Independent School District
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IHRL will also set the foundation for using human rights law in federal
courts.
Because state court judges have less of a public audience, they
might be more apt to apply IHRL than the Supreme Court Justices. The
rediscovery of state courts has been "encouraged by social reform groups
that began to look to state courts as a new arena in which to pursue their
goals as the U.S. Supreme Court became increasingly unsympathetic to
their agenda. '270 According to Professor Anthony Tarr, litigants have been
instrumental in causing state judges to explore their state constitutions in
ways that they would not have done on their own initiative. 271 One Judge-
Participant at the 1992 Forum for State Judges remarked that:
On our court, we see our role as writing and interpreting for
a different constituency from the United States Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court writes for a very broad constit-
uency and deals with problems that have probably the low-
est common denominator. We think that in our small state
we can perhaps have a little more play in the joints, give a
smidgeon more freedom here and there, because we're not
writing for the national scene.272
In addition, because the freedoms found in state law often surpass those
found in federal law, state courts can expand upon them using IHRL as an
interpretive aid in ways that the federal courts cannot. IHRL litigation has
found a new forum in state courts, where substantive state constitutional
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)]. But the matter did not end
there. Litigation was then instituted in many states arguing that
unequal educational opportunities were in violation of various
clauses in state constitutions. During the past two and a half de-
cades such suits have been brought twenty-eight times in some
twenty-four states. In fourteen of these cases state supreme
courts invalidated their state's method of financing education, in-
volving the reallocation of billions of dollars. In some instances
these decisions altered the entire structure of the state educational
system.
Id. at 85 (citation omitted).
270 AMERICAN BAR Assoc., JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON THE 2 1ST CENTURY JUDICIARY 15 (2003) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY].
See also William Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977).
271 JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 270, at 15.
272 ROSCOE POUND FOUNDATION & YALE LAW SCHOOL, PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM 63 (1993).
HUMAN RIGHTS BEGIN AT HOME
rights are litigated with increasing frequency using international norms as
interpretive aids.
2. IHRL Comports with Justifications for Local Justice
The idea of local justice was so important to the drafters of the
Rome Statute of the ICC that the idea of complementarity was written into
it for this very reason.27 3 Seeing that IHRL embodies universal values and
norms that are shared by all, local courts have the first chance to do the
right thing and enforce these standards. If the local court fails or refuses to
do so, then it is the job of the federal courts (or an international court) to do
it for them.
States are, in fact, making a comeback. The revival of state consti-
tutionalism in recent decades "was stimulated by concerns similar to those
animating human rights activists - a sense that the federal Constitution does
not fully guarantee basic human dignity, especially in the realm of eco-
nomic and social rights. '274 It is in these areas of social welfare where state
laws surpass federal law, meaning that state courts are more accessible to
claims concerning the needs of their citizens.27 5 As Justice Doggett of the
Texas Supreme Court explained, "this is not just the rebellion of the country
bumpkins or the provinces against the center. Rather, it is fundamentally
the notion that the states can be a source of new ideas.1276 State courts that
have more generous constitutions to work with than do the federal courts do
indeed have much to offer their citizens in terms of implementing their
international human rights.
By using state courts to empower themselves with the tools of
IHRL, a sense of local ownership can be created. In the same sense, state
273 The Preamble to the Rome Statute states that the ICC "shall be complementary
to national criminal jurisdictions .... " Rome Statute, supra note 12, at Preamble.
274 Fitzpatrick, supra note 264, at 265.
275 See Part IV, supra text.
276 Justice Lloyd Doggett, Response to Professor Amar, in PROTECTING INDIVID-
UAL RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM 49, 53 (1993):
We talk about a floor under the federal Bill of Rights and a ceil-
ing provided by the states. With that federal floor in apparent
free fall, the place where the exciting legal questions of our day
will be resolved is in our state courts. I think we can take a great
deal of pride as state judges that in our courthouses across the
country we will have an opportunity to deal with the tough issues
of the next century. In the process, we can contribute to the na-
tional jurisprudence, and hopefully to a future reawakening to in-
dividual liberties here in our nation's capital.
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courts are more flexible and able to evolve than federal courts. The rules
that are made in state courts are uniquely local and apply to the people who
live in that state.
3. Local Governments Have Already Begun to Implement IHRL
States and cities have already begun looking to IHRL to help their
communities, going so far as passing international treaties as local laws.
Implementing IHRL at the local level has become a creative strategy that
allows human rights activists to "bypass federal resistance to international
human rights standards, and instead focuses on putting these standards to
work right in our own communities by making local governments accounta-
ble to them. '277 Of course, neither states nor cities may sign international
instruments, but considering the lack of will at the federal level to do so,
local governments may choose implementation of IHRL as a more effective
way to pull the U.S. into compliance with international human rights stan-
dards. Litigants may use the following examples of local implementation to
guide state judges.
In 1998, the city of San Francisco was the first city or state in the
country to implement CEDAW as a local ordinance. Because of the lack of
federal action to do so, Mayor Willie L. Brown Jr. signed into law an ordi-
nance that "implements the principles underlying the [CEDAW]. '278 The
city acknowledged that the San Francisco CEDAW provision "represents
the growth of an indigenous human rights movement in the United
States.'279 For example, New York City is in the process of adopting
CEDAW as a local law. Launched in 2002, the New York City Human
Rights Initiative was "[i]nspired by the San Francisco success '280 but goes
even further by combining the principles of CEDAW with CERD, the con-
vention against racial discrimination. 281 The local laws are being advocated
as providing the city with "specific guidelines and tools that incorporate
277 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS: MAKING HUMAN
RIGHTS MEANINGFUL IN OUR COMMUNITIES, par. 4, available at http://www.
amnestyu sa.org/women/interact/cerd-cedaw.html [hereinafter AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL].
278 Press Release, The City and County of San Francisco, Department on the Status
of Women, San Francisco Releases the First U.S. City Human Rights Report on
Women (Nov. 5, 1999), available at http://www.sfgov.org/site/dosw-page.asp?id=
19793.
279 Id., quoting Krishanti Dharmaraj, Executive Director of the Women's Institute
for Leadership Development for Human Rights.
280 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 277.
281 Id. par. 6.
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human rights principles, create preventive measures, enable more effective
public participation and, ultimately, improve the quality of life for all New
Yorkers. '282 These two examples help illustrate how local governments
have begun to accept their role in the implementation of international
human rights, and how human rights truly begins close to home.
But one cautionary tale comes from Massachusetts. In 1996, a few
months before federal sanctions were imposed against Burma for their
human rights abuses, the Massachusetts legislature adopted the Massachu-
setts Burma Law which restricted the ability of Massachusetts agencies to
do business with Burma. Because of the Congressional action, though, the
Supreme Court, in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, declared the
state law unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause, "owing to its threat
of frustrating statutory objectives. '283 However, many other states and cit-
ies have passed similar "selective purchasing laws" and so long as they do
not encroach on the federal foreign affairs powers, they will be upheld as
constitutional. 284
4. Immunity from Supreme Court Review
The Supreme Court cannot review a state court decision that was
decided on independent and adequate state grounds. The decision must
have been "independent from federal grounds and adequate to support the
state court decision, '285 but a federal court may review a case if "the state
has failed to protect rights granted by the federal constitution. '286 Moreo-
ver, if a Supreme Court reversal of the federal law basis of the decision will
not change the result in the case, the Supreme Court cannot hear the case. 287
Therefore, a state decision that used international human rights law to guide
its interpretation of the state constitution will be immune from Supreme
Court review, signifying the considerable latitude state judges have in using
IHRL to support their decisions.
282 Id. par. 9.
283 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000).
284 See EARTHRIGHTS INTERNATIONAL, USA LEAD: SELECTIVE PURCHASING
LAWS, available at http://www.earthrights.org/usalead/spl.shtml.
285 Penny J. White, Legal, Political, and Ethical Hurdles to Applying International
Human Rights Law in the State Courts of the United States (And Arguments for
Scaling Them), 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 937, 944 (2003).
286 Id.
287 See Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983).
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C. Objections to State Courts Using IHRL
1. The Effects of Federalism on Human Rights
There is much concern over federalism decisions by the Supreme
Court. Some argue that these decisions do not enhance liberty, as the advo-
cates suggest, but that they instead have the opposite effect. The scholarly
work on the subject is often inconclusive:
There are.., huge literatures on how - depending on one's
take - federalism either improves government or impedes
progress, enhances freedom or permits racism, fosters par-
ticipatory democracy or entrenches local elites, facilitates
regulatory diversity or creates races to the bottom, protects
individual liberty or encourages tyranny, promotes respon-
sible fiscal policy or generates inexorable pressures to ex-
pand government, and on and on. 288
Ultimately, individual rights depend not on recent federalism decisions, but
on how states exercise their delegated authority vis-A-vis decisions that
have decreased Congress' regulatory power. Human rights attorneys must,
therefore, remain diligent advocates for the application of IHRL in state
courts.
The argument against federalism rests on a few main points. Legal
scholars Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley assert that federalism "does
not secure citizen participation, does not make government more responsive
or efficient by creating competition, and does not encourage experimenta-
tion. '289 Moreover, Erwin Chemerinsky believes that "over time, there is
no reason to believe that federalism decisions will do more to advance than
restrict liberty. ' 290 Even assuming this is true, there is an urgent need to
litigate at the state level to counter the restrictions of liberty that may be
caused by a reemergence of states' rights decisions.
An assumption that is often made is that states encourage local par-
ticipation because they are fundamentally closer to the people. Rubin and
Feeley, however, state that this "is one of the many unproven assumptions
288 Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994).
289 Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 909 (1994); see also Burt Neuborne, The Myth of
Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (arguing that federal courts are more likely
than state courts to effectively enforce negative rights).
290 Erwin Chemerinsky, Have the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions In-
creased Liberty?, HUM. RTs. MAG. (Fall 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/
irr/hr/fall02/liberty.html.
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that fester in this field without either theoretical or empirical support. 291
They provide empirical proof that "support for urban planning generally, or
for specific city functions such as schools or police, has often come from
the federal government, not from the states. ' 292 They also urge that "feder-
alism should not be imposed as a constraint on national policy. '293 In this
vein, federalism serves as a poor excuse when local justice does not do the
right thing.
In addition, local governments have often been worse for minorities
than a centralized or federal government. Federal governments are likely to
provide more protections for "minority subgroups that otherwise face intol-
erance by local authorities." 294 The danger of small communities making
substantive rules, rather than having a national uniform policy, is their po-
tential to make decisions that are xenophobic. On the other hand, commu-
nities may also try to enhance tolerance and the respect for human rights.2 95
Recommending that human rights advocates litigate IHRL at the state level,
however, does not require a dismissal of these arguments. Utilizing a "bot-
tom-up" approach to implement human rights is not mutually exclusive
from pressing the federal government, in a "top-down" approach, to comply
with IHRL as well.
Federalists often resist the use of international law in American
courts, considering it to be an invasion of foreign principles. The fact that
international law "evolves on the basis of the views of entities, such as
domestic and foreign jurists, foreign and transnational courts and treaty
making bodies,' 296 concerns one federalist, who posits that these bodies are
"'neither representative of the American political community nor respon-
sive to it.' "297 However, persuading states to implement IHRL on their
own, and not through foreign compulsion or federal regulation of local ac-
tivity, alleviates this fear.
The goals of federalism comport with advocating the use of state
courts, as opposed to federal courts, in deciding cases that implicate IHRL
291 Rubin & Feeley, supra note 289, at 916.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 951.
294 Martha Minow, Putting Up and Putting Down: Tolerance Reconsidered, in
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM, EUROPE AND AMERICA 78 (Mark
Tushnet ed., 1990).
295 See, e.g. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 289, at 940-41.
296 Christian G. Vergonis, The Federalism Implications of International Human
Rights Law, FED. Soc. L. & PUB. POL'Y STUD. 12, available at http://www.fed-soc.
org/Intllaw&%2OAmerSov/Int%271%20(final)%20vergonis.pdf (citation omitted).
297 Id.
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in local communities. Federalism is a system of government that distributes
power between national and state governments. The U.S. Constitution es-
tablished our federalist system by giving Congress certain enumerated pow-
ers, such as Article I, § 8,298 and by giving the rest of the powers not
delegated to the federal government to the states.299 Decisions by the Su-
preme Court "signal a halt in the Court's willingness to uphold federal reg-
ulation claimed to intrude on state government competencies."300 This
provides an impetus for states to reclaim their constitutional power.
Our federalist system created the capacity for each state to take care
of its own citizens, never intending the federal government to take over
these obligations. The Constitution left "the 'police power' - the protection
of public health, safety, and morals - . . to the states, with the federal
government entrusted with less sensitive powers like those over interstate
and foreign commerce. '"301 While the federal government has in fact en-
acted many social welfare programs, it is under no legal obligation to do so,
and is "legally free to shift these responsibilities back to the states. '302 The
combination of the intent of the federalist system which left social rights to
be protected by the states, and the current uncertainty in the continuance of
federal welfare programs, explains why state constitutions often include so-
cial rights; thus, litigating IHRL at the state level can result in substantial
rewards.
One must fully understand the goals of a federalist constitution in
order to appreciate the link between IHRL and state courts. The Founding
Fathers designed this system with three complementary objectives in mind:
"(1) '[t]o secure the public good'; (2) to protect 'private rights'; and (3) 'to
298 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
299 The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
300 VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
792 (1999). See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 98 (1997); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000).
301 Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1484, 1506 (1987).
302 Barbara Stark, Economic Rights in the United States and International Human
Rights Law: Toward an "Entirely New Strategy,'" 44 HASTINGS L.J. 79, 94-96
(1992).
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preserve the spirit and form of popular government.'"303 But why did they
believe that these objectives would be met by giving states more power?
First, they believed that federalism "assures a decentralized government
that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous soci-
ety. ' 304 Second, federalism increases the opportunities for citizen involve-
ment in the democratic processes, making the local governments "more
responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry. 30 5
Local governments also help foster citizen political participation by "pro-
viding alternative and perhaps more accessible fora for political participa-
tion than does the federal government. ' 30 6 Third, federalism "allows for
more innovation and experimentation in government." 307 Litigating IHRL
in a conservative state court might, therefore, be bolstered by raising these
federalism justifications to the court.
Even though our system provides that the federal Constitution
serves as a floor for rights, this has less to do with federalism than it does
with not trusting majoritarian rule. Certain fundamental issues relating to
rights and justice are subject to a national rule that binds both levels of
government.308 An intergovernmental system serves as a check on state
governments if fundamental rights are violated. A prime example is the
Rodney King incident where, despite evidence to the contrary, a jury in
California state court acquitted the policemen of the March 1991 beating.
A retrial in federal court resulted in the conviction of two of the four Los
Angeles Police Department officers for violating King's federal civil
rights.30 9
Federalism also gives states more power to respond to needs that
are neglected by the federal government, including protecting themselves
from federal violations of human rights. The federal government's blatant
refusal to incorporate IHRL into domestic law does not prevent the state
from providing these norms to its own citizens. Another rationale for feder-
303 McConnell, supra note 301, at 1492, citing Federalist 10 (Madison), in THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS 80 (1961).
304 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
305 Id.
306 Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Com-
mandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001,
1077 (1995).
307 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (1991).
308 McConnell, supra note 301, at 1506-07.
309 United States v. Koon, 833 F.Supp. 769 (C.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd in part, vacated
in part, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded,
518 U.S. 81 (1996).
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alism was the Founding Fathers' belief of "the role of the states as a bul-
wark against possible federal tyranny,"31 0 where "state governments can
compete with the federal government in providing public goods and social
services."31' Along these lines, states and cities, concerned that the federal
government is not properly providing for its citizens, have recently begun to
increase the minimum wage in their locality from the federal minimum
wage of $5.15 an hour. For example, in February 2003, Santa Fe, New
Mexico passed a "living wage" ordinance that "set the wage floor at $8.50
an hour, which would increase to $9.50 in January 2006 and $10.50 in
2008."312 Santa Fe City Councilor Carol Robertson Lopez stated that "the
living wage is an indicator of when we've given up on the federal govern-
ment to solve our problems. So local people have to take it on their
own. ' 313 Santa Fe's power to mandate a minimum wage higher than the
current state and federal minimum hourly wage was upheld by the court of
appeals in New Mexicans for Free Enterprise v. City of Santa Fe.314
Although the appellate court's decision did not mention IHRL, New
Mexicans for Free Enterprise provided perfect fodder for arguments for
state courts to accept the relevance of IHRL provisions such as ICESCR
Article 7 recognizing the right to fair wages and a decedent living. Propo-
nents of a living wage hope that raising minimum wages in cities and states
will pressure the federal government to take action. This strategy is not
new. Harvard Professor Richard Freeman explains that "a lot of the New
Deal legislation, good or bad, came about because there was a lot of state
legislation,"3 15 and that the "things that work the best might be adopted
nationally. 3 16 Under this rubric, state courts upholding IHRL might pres-
sure the federal government to ratify and implement international human
rights treaties.
Liberals have historically been opposed to federalism, but federal-
ism might in fact be the lynchpin in securing human rights in the U.S. If
310 John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States' Rights: A Defense of
Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 89, 110 (2004).
311 Id. at 111. Some federal congressmen argue that the issues addressed by inter-
national human rights treaties "are within the exclusive authority of the states, and
that national adoption would infringe on state sovereignty." Stark, supra note 302,
at 82.
312 Jon Gertner, What Is a Living Wage?, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine), Jan. 15, 2006 at
§ 6, 38.
313 Id.
314 N.M.C.A. No. 25,073 (Nov. 29, 2005).
315 Gertner, supra note 312.
316 Id.
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the federal government refuses to implement IHRL into domestic law, as
has been and continues to be the case, then the only alternative is utilizing
the states to bring human rights home. In fact, some liberal judges in the
Ninth Circuit have caught on and have "used federalism precedents to par-
tially invalidate federal laws against possession of pornography and medical
use of marijuana, and a leading conservative judge used these precedents to
invalidate a federal gun control law." 317 These decisions illustrate the
growing trend of using federalism to protect civil rights and liberties.
Scholars have advocated expanding the federalism doctrine into areas
where support is stronger at the state level.3 18
Perhaps, however, it need not be a sincerely held belief in the vir-
tues of federalism, and could be more of an opportunistic strategy whose
ends justify the means. For instance, some conservatives tout federalism
only when they like the outcome. The flurry of political steam surrounding
the removal of Terry Schiavo's feeding tube is a perfect example. In March
2005, Congress passed a bill subsequently signed into law by President
Bush allowing federal courts to take over Shiavo's case from the Florida
state courts. One of the few Republicans who voted against the bill admit-
ted that his "party is demonstrating that they are for states' rights unless
they don't like what states are doing,"3 19 adding that "[t]his couldn't be a
more classic case of a state responsibility. '320 It is not difficult, however,
for a liberal to develop a genuine respect for states' rights; doing so will
decrease public perceptions of political maneuvering as was the case with
the Republicans in the Schiavo incident.
2. Lawyers Will Use IHRL Only if it is Effective
Persuading a state court to accept the reasoning of IHRL has no
guarantees. Lawyers undoubtedly will not waste their time on an approach
that has not been effective in the past. However, a first step is always nec-
essary and human rights attorneys must help initiate the process of inform-
ing judges of international law by citing and analyzing the applicable
317 McGinnis & Somin, supra note 310, at 129, citing United States v. McCoy, 323
F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003) (pornography); Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th
Cir. 2003) (marijuana); United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003)
(machine guns).
318 See, e.g., Stephen Clark, Progressive Federalism? A Gay Liberationist Per-
spective, 66 ALB. L. REv. 719 (2003) (arguing that enforcing federalism advances
gay rights).
319 Rep. Christopher Shays of Connecticut, quoted in Adam Nagourney, G.O.P.
Right Is Splintered On Schiavo Intervention, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 23, 2005, at A14.
320 Id.
190 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 12
materials in their briefs and oral arguments.3 21 Referring to this dilemma,
one Supreme Court Justice stated that:
There is a chicken-and-egg problem. The lawyers will [ar-
gue IHRL] only if they believe the courts are receptive. By
now, however, it should be clear that the chicken has bro-
ken out of the egg. The demand is there. To supply that
demand, the law professors, who teach the law students,
who will become the lawyers, who will brief the courts,
must themselves help to break down barriers.322
Eventually, more state judges will become well-versed in IHRL. Until that
day, lawyers should find some solace in the few precedents that can be
found in state courts and strive to add to that list. When traditional methods
of litigating rights do not work, the strategy of using IHRL provides an
alternative method.
3. State Judges Lack a Sufficient Understanding of IHRL
Willful ignorance is not a valid criminal defense; likewise, the will-
ful ignorance of many judges (and Americans in general) 323 is not a proper
objection to litigating IHRL in state courts. Unfortunately, this sort of igno-
rance has harmful consequences for those who litigate human rights. For
example, many non-citizen criminal defendants challenge the constitution-
ality of their conviction due to the denial of their right to speak with their
consulate, as provided for in the VCCR.3 24 In 1997, the Mexican govern-
ment had one of its nationals on death row in Texas claiming that Texas
violated the VCCR. Alberto Gonzalez, who at that time was the legal coun-
321 The author of this article had trouble convincing opposing counsel of the merits
of IHRL. After citing the CRC in a motion to reconsider the judgment to commit a
juvenile delinquent to state custody, the Assistant District Attorney responded in
her motion that "[i]nternational law is irrelevant and not even persuasive in this
matter," adding that the defense counsel "fails to differentiate ideals from reality."
Subsequently, the judge denied the motion without explanation. State v. Amber S.,
JR-2002-109 (3d Jud. Dist., N.M.).
322 Justice Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address,97 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 265, 267
(2003).
323 According to a 1997 poll commissioned by the National Center for Human
Rights Education, "92 percent of Americans had never heard of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights . . . 'Most people we meet still think of human rights as
letter-writing campaigns to help free political prisoners."' FORD FOUNDATION,
supra note 30, at 47, quoting Loretta Ross.
124 VCCR, supra note 20, at art. 36.
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sel to Governor Bush, proved his ignorance of international (and constitu-
tional) law by writing that "[s]ince the State of Texas is not a signatory to
the [VCCR], we believe it is inappropriate to ask Texas to determine
whether a breach . . . occurred in connection with the arrest and convic-
tion.1325 Two days later, Texas executed the defendant. That some state
judges are passionate about human rights and will make reference to IHRL
in their decisions, speaks to the fact that not all state judges are uninformed
of IHRL. Even if a judge is unfamiliar with IHRL, a litigant must, as in all
other cases, educate the court of areas of the law that are in the best interest
of the client.
4. State Judges are Political and Will Not Jeopardize Their Potential for
Re-election
States select their judges through elections, appointments, or a com-
bination of both. Even if a judge is initially appointed, the fact remains that
"forty-one states require at least some of their judges to stand for election to
remain in [office] ."326 In contrast to federal judges who are appointed for
life, state judges face periodic elections that are oftentimes harshly political.
It is not uncommon to hear of elections where a city has "punished" a judge
for unpopular decisions. For example, after its Supreme Court retention
election, Tennessee Governor Don Sundquist admitted to this trend by stat-
ing, "[s]hould a judge look over his shoulder [when making decisions]
about whether they're going to be thrown out of office? I hope S0."1327 Our
judicial system was designed, however, to allow judges to protect individ-
ual rights at the expense of majoritarian disapproval.
Judges are often chided for a predictable range of issues. Most of
the challenges are centered on opinions covering "school funding, abortion
and parental consent, application of the death penalty, and tort reform. '328
One former state judge believes it is "unrealistic" 329 in the present atmos-
phere to "expect a state court judge, subject to retention or reelection, to
initiate the application of [IHRL] in a state court, in the absence of higher
state court or federal court precedent or a directive from another branch of
325 Mauro, supra note 185.
326 Emily Field Van Tassel, Challenges to Constitutional Decisions of State Courts
and Institutional Pressures on State Judiciaries, in JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra
note 270, Appendix E, at 3 (2003).
327 JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 270, at 18, citing Stephen Bright, Political
Attacks on the Judiciary, 80 JUDICATURE 165, 166 (1997).
328 Van Tassel, supra note 326, at 4.
329 White, supra note 285, at 961.
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government. '330 She explains that when faced with an IHRL claim, most
state judges avoid the issue "either by asserting a procedural bar, a binding
Senate reservation, or a federalism rationale. ' 331 Yet this is not a problem
unique to state judges - federal judges also avoid applying IHRL. This
should not prevent lawyers from endeavoring to alter this trend.
5. IHRL is Perceived as Un-American
Relating to the point that many state judges are not well-educated in
international law is the argument that IHRL interferes with the democratic
law making process. For some, international human rights treaties may
"constitute 'imported' values that are somehow delegitimized because they
did not follow the traditional law making process. ' 332 State politicians
often communicate this belief as a barrier between U.S. and international
institutions that oversee international human rights compliance. For exam-
ple, in U.S. v. Breard3 33 a Paraguayan citizen was tried and convicted of
murder in the Virginia state courts and sentenced to death. While the case
was being appealed to the ICJ on claims of a violation of the VCCR, the
ICJ "indicated as a matter of urgency provisional measures that the United
States should take to avoid the execution scheduled for that week. ' 334 Ac-
cordingly, the U.S. Secretary of State asked the Governor of Virginia to
stay Breard's execution for foreign policy reasons. Despite this request, the
Governor said:
I am concerned that to delay Mr. Breard's execution so that
the International Court of Justice may review this matter
would have the practical effect of transferring responsibil-
ity from the courts of the Commonwealth and the United
States to the International Court ....
The U.S. Department of Justice, together with Virginia's
Attorney General, make a compelling case that the Interna-
tional Court of Justice has no authority to interfere with our
criminal justice system. Indeed, the safety of those residing
in the Commonwealth of Virginia is not the responsibility
of the International Court of Justice. It is my responsibility
330 Id.
331 Id.
332 Todd Howland, Rael v. Taylor and the Colorado Constitution: How Human
Rights Law Ensures Constitutional Protection in the Private Sphere, 26 DENy. J.
INT'L L. & PoL'Y 1, 25 (1997), citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
333 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
114 STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 38, at 745.
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and the responsibility of law enforcement and judicial offi-
cials throughout the Commonwealth. I cannot cede such
responsibility to the International Court of Justice....
... I find no reason to interfere with his sentence.335
Not surprisingly, Breard was executed. This reflects a common belief
among Americans that the U.S. may criticize other countries for their
human rights abuses but should not allow the international community to
critique how the U.S. treats its own nationals.
Enforcing the rights often found in IHRL may also be viewed as
over-stepping the boundaries of the judiciary. There are assumptions that
positive rights - those that "invite and demand government '33 6 - are un-
American, are costly, and are incapable of being judicially enforced. These
are false assumptions. First, many states already have positive rights in
their constitutions.337 Second, all rights necessitate a remedy and thus even
negative rights - those that ban and exclude government action - are not
cost-free.3 38 Lastly, state judges may constitutionally enforce positive rights
embedded in state constitutions. Therefore, the positive rights found in
IHRL and the jurisprudence surrounding them can be utilized to give mean-
ing to the positive rights included in state constitutions.
It is accurate, however, to say that the federal government was in-
tended to protect negative rights. The Constitution created a federal gov-
ernment with no general police powers and a Bill of Rights that was purely
negative; "[i]t marked off a world of the spirit in which government should
have no jurisdiction; it raised procedural barriers to unwarranted intru-
sion. ''339 Yet this is so only in relation to the federal government; states
were intended to provide for the greater good of their populations. This
explains why state constitutions have historically "focused not only on the
political structure of government, but also on the provision of public goods,
the promotion of community values, and the regulation of state and local
335 Id.
336 STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY
DEPENDS ON TAXES 40 (1999).
337 See TABLE 4: A SAMPLE OF POSITIVE RIGHTS FOUND IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra text Part V(A)(3).
338 Id.
339 Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, Foreword: Constitutional Ad-
judication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 93 (1966-
67).
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finance. 340 An abundance of social and economic rights are found in state
constitutions. 341
Enforcing both negative and positive rights implicates budgetary
matters. This should not stop courts from seriously considering applying
positive rights found in IHRL. For example, even the most negative rights,
like the "right to free speech and private property, require governmental
action"342 because "[p]rivate property cannot exist without a governmental
apparatus, ready and able to secure people's holdings as such"343 and be-
cause they "need significant taxpayer support."'34  Enforcing positive rights
that require governmental expenditures, therefore, is not any different than
a judge requiring extra police to protect the Nazis marching through Skokie.
Although "[i]t seems simpler for a court to order the government to stop
interfering with speech than for a court to determine how much funding is
needed for secondary education, 3 45 courts throughout the world have done
just that.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the practical sense, human rights advocates should focus on all
levels of government - international, regional, and domestic - in order to
have a greater impact on human rights. 346 Yet because international and
regional institutions have proven inadequate to deal with American legal
issues, lawyers are left with domestic litigation. Furthermore, using state
courts to implement international human rights is an avenue replete with
possibilities that do not exist at the federal level. Federal courts, both le-
gally and politically, fail to provide an adequate forum for litigating IHRL.
Specifically, the legal trend in federal courts is to refrain from enforcing
human rights treaties that contain non-self-executing clauses.
Although these treaties can be used as a defense and as an interpre-
tive tool in both state and federal courts, the more substantive laws that can
be interpreted using IHRL exist in state constitutions and statutes. In addi-
tion, relying on IHRL to interpret a state constitution insulates the decision
340 Hershkoff, supra note 7, at 812-13 (citations omitted).
341 See supra text Part V(A)(3).
342 CASs R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do 222
(2001).
343 Id. at 222-23.
344 Id. at 223.
345 Kende, supra note 2, at 155.
346 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS INTERNET, DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LITIGATING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS,
available at www.hri.ca/fortherecordCanada/voll/guide-part_l 1.htm.
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from Supreme Court review. As opposed to the limited reach of the four
federal human rights statutes, state courts have more legal routes for imple-
menting IHRL. State courts can find that human rights abuses occurring in
the state or abuses that occur outside the state by a state citizen or corpora-
tion violate the state constitution. Moreover, our Founding Fathers' ratio-
nales for federalism indicate a preference for state courts to respond to the
local needs of their citizens, giving states the opportunity to implement
IHRL in ways that affect the day-to-day lives of Americans.
This solution can garner support from both sides of the interna-
tional debate. Those on the left will support the fact that IHRL is finally
being implemented in the U.S. and those on the right will support the fact
that an international body is not judging America; rather, a state judges its
own state's compliance with international norms. Of course, the initial hur-
dle is to overcome the "prevailing arrogant view that all things American
are good and just"3 47 and accept the truth that "[s]tate courts are transna-
tional actors, too."348 International human rights law was designed to pres-
sure nations to honor and respect human rights through their domestic laws
so that everyday life would be an embodiment of these norms.3 49 State
courts tend to have more of an impact on the lives of ordinary citizens and
are therefore the most appropriate starting point in achieving this goal. Not
only will state courts be able to add to the IHRL jurisprudence, but they will
also help bring the U.S. into compliance with international human rights
standards.
347 Law Professor Speedy Rice, quoted in FORD FOUNDATION, supra note 30, at 25.
348 Tulsa Law Professor Janet Levit, quoted in Mauro, supra note 185 (regarding
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' ruling that enforced the ICJ's ruling in
the Osbaldo Torres case).
349 See Louis Henkin, International Human Rights and Rights in the United States,
in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 25 (The-
odor Meron ed., 1984).
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